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Trade Law’s Responses to the Rise of China
Wentong Zheng*
ABSTRACT
This Article offers a systematic examination of trade law’s responses to the
emergence of China as a major player in world trade. As an intricate set of rules
written largely prior to the advent of the China era, trade law had to readjust to
the powerful newcomer in ways that eventually changed trade law itself. This
Article investigates these changes in four major areas of trade law: antidumping,
countervailing duties, safeguards, and managed trade. In almost all of those
areas, trade law witnessed a protectionist shift against Chinese products at the
expense of sound, consistent principles. But, at the same time, trade law has
corrected some of the most egregious protectionist policies on China. These
adaptations on the part of trade law tell a story of how an organic legal system
evolves in response to changing external circumstances. This Article concludes
that at least as an initial assessment, trade law has been rather successful in
accommodating China in the new world trade order and has preserved the
structural stability of the world trade system without deviating too far from its
core principles.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the “great dramas” of the twenty-first century is the ascent of China
on the world stage.1 In the span of less than four decades, China’s per capita
gross domestic product leapt almost forty-fold from less than two hundred U.S.
dollars in 1981 to over seventy-five hundred U.S. dollars in 2014.2 In 2010,
China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy after the
United States.3 Measured in purchasing power parity, China’s economy has
already overtaken that of the United States as the world’s largest.4
One key reason for China’s miraculous economic growth is its participation
in international trade. In 1978, China accounted for less than one percent of
world trade.5 That percentage jumped to over ten percent in 2013, twelve years
after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.6 Today, China is one
of the most important players in world trade, ranking as the world’s largest
exporting country and second largest importing country of merchandise.7

1. See G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal
System Survive?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2008, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/200801-01/rise-china-and-future-west.
GDP
2. See
PER
CAPITA
(current
US$),
WORLD
BANK
(2016),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
3. Andrew Monahan, China Overtakes Japan as World’s No. 2 Economy, WALL ST. J., Feb.
14, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703361904576142832741439402.
4. Keith Fray, China’s Leap Forward: Overtaking the U.S. as the World’s Biggest Economy,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/ftdata/2014/10/08/chinas-leap-forward-overtaking-theus-as-worlds-biggest-economy/. Purchasing Power Parity measures a country’s economy taking into
account varying price levels between countries, particularly in goods and services that are not open
to international competition. Id.
5. Markus Taube, Economic Relations Between the PRC and the States of Europe, in CHINA
AND EUROPE SINCE 1978: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 78, 80 (Richard L. Edmonds ed. 2002).
TRADE
ORG.,
6. See
Trade
Profile:
China,
WORLD
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=CN& (last visited July 31,
2016).
7. See id.
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The rise of China represents a seismic shift in the world trade order. While
creating enormous economic opportunities within its borders, China’s
participation in world trade caused massive job losses in countries that import
Chinese products.8 In response, China’s trading partners took numerous trade
actions against Chinese products, within and without the parameters of global
trade law.9
This Article documents how trade law responded to the rise of China in
world trade. As an intricate set of rules written largely prior to the advent of the
China era, trade law had to readjust to the powerful newcomer in ways that
eventually changed trade law itself. This Article investigates these changes in
four major areas of trade law: antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguards,
and managed trade.10 In almost all of those areas, trade law witnessed a
protectionist shift against Chinese products at the expense of sound, consistent
principles. But at the same time, trade law has corrected some of the most
egregious protectionist policies on China. These nuanced responses showcase
trade law’s struggle to regain its footing in the face of unprecedented challenges
posed by China’s emergence as a major economic power.
Trade law’s responses to China offer a case study of the compromises
inherent in “embedded liberalism,” a trade system where the objective of free
trade is balanced against the objective of allowing national governments
sufficient space for protectionist policies.11 This Article tells a story of how
China disrupted this balance, and how trade law attempted to rebalance itself by
finetuning the major trade policy instruments as they were applied to China. The
Article concludes that at least as an initial assessment, trade law has been rather
successful in preserving the systemic stability of the world trade system without
compromising too much on its core principles.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the two competing
considerations of trade law: free trade principles and protectionism. Part II
discusses how trade law’s balance between these two competing considerations
was altered in response to the external shocks China caused to the world trade
system. In so doing, it centers its discussions on WTO law and policies practiced
by the United States and the European Union in four major trade law areas:
antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguards, and managed trade. Finally, Part

8. According to an estimate by a Washington-based think tank, trade with China caused the
loss of 3.2 million jobs in the United States between 2001 and 2013. See Robert E. Scott & Will
Kimball, China Trade, Outsourcing and Jobs, ECON. POL’Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER #385, Dec. 11,
2014, at 2, http://s2.epi.org/files/2014/bp385-china-trade-deficit.pdf.
9. See Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China’s Experience in Dealing With WTO Dispute
Settlement: A Chinese Perspective, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 2 (2011) (“Chinese Products are
frequently subjected to trade remedy measures and non-tariff barriers in overseas markets . . . .”).
10. See infra Part II.
11. For discussions of embedded liberalism, see ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER
NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011); John G. Ruggie,
International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism and the Post-war
Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORGANIZATION 379 (1982).
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III offers thoughts on the prospect of trade law’s rebalancing with respect to
China and whether that rebalancing has been successful thus far.
I.
TRADE LAW AS A BALANCE
This Article starts with a basic proposition that trade law embodies a
delicate balance between two competing considerations: free trade principles
and protectionism. On one hand, trade law strives to adhere to a set of free trade
principles aimed at reducing trade barriers and discriminatory practices. On the
other hand, as a matter of practical necessity, trade law condones certain
protectionist policies that deviate from its core principles for purposes of
maintaining the structural stability of the world trade system. These two
competing considerations of trade law have to be viewed together to gain a full
appreciation of the nature and practice of trade law. As shall become clear, they
also form the basic analytical framework for examining trade law’s responses to
China’s rise in world trade.
A. Free Trade Principles
One overarching goal of trade law is to move from a “power-oriented” to a
“rule-oriented” regime.12 Under the auspices of the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the WTO, trade law has come a
long way in accomplishing this goal.13 Scholars concededly disagree as to the
extent to which trade law could be characterized as “law” as a court would apply
it.14 However, there is a broad consensus that having a rule-based trade law
12. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8-10 (2000) (discussing the value of a rule-oriented
approach as opposed to a power-oriented approach in the design of international institutions relating
to economic activity).
13. See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 VA.
L. REV. 251, 253-60 (2006) (describing the shift from the power-based dispute resolution system
under the GATT to the rule-based system under the WTO); R. E. Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty,
Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 211, 219-20
(2002) (“The conventional history of GATT/WTO dispute settlement . . . teaches that GATT dispute
settlement evolved from a ‘diplomatic’ instrument into a ‘judicial’ instrument.”); Arie Reich, From
Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
775, 776 (1997) (“In recent years, however, there is a growing demand by States to regulate their
trade relations by using norms and enforcement procedures that are LEGAL in character, create
significant limitations on the sovereignty of the States, and, in extreme cases, even exclude the
States’ power to determine policy in certain socio-economic fields.”). But see Joost Pauwelyn, RuleBased Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and International Standards and How They May
Outcompete WTO Treaties, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 740-45 (2014) (arguing that since the turn of
the millennium trade law has witnessed a stagnation of formal treaty-making and a rise in informal
rules and mechanisms).
14. Some scholars take the view that the GATT, in essence, is a legal system. See, e.g., JAMES
FAWCETT, LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87 (1982) (“GATT is both in form and
practice an illuminating example of law in international relations.”); Daniel K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth
and International Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 533, 533 (1985) (noting that the

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38CS1Z
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system is desirable because it allows for “creating greater predictability,
redressing unfair power imbalances, and preventing escalating international
tensions.”15
Trade law, however, is not just any set of rules. It is built on certain
principles. At the core of trade law is the so-called “liberal economic doctrine,”
which recognizes the benefits of free trade to all participating countries.16 As a
result, the primary purpose of the GATT and the WTO is to dismantle trade
barriers.17 This free trade agenda manifests itself in the fundamental principles
of the GATT and the WTO, such as the most-favored nation principle, the
national treatment principle, and the tariff binding principle.18
Trade law’s aspiration to be a principles-based system requires it to be
systemically coherent, so that its various components reflect the same policy
considerations.19 This systemic coherence is crucial for, among other things,
consistent judicial interpretations of inevitably incomplete treaty rules.20 The
desire to maintain systemic coherence in trade law can be seen in the WTO’s
umbrella agreement—the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. The
preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement refers to “the basic principles . . . and the
objectives underlying this multilateral trading system.”21 The WTO Appellate

international trade system “looks more like a legal system than do the areas of international law
traditionally denominated ‘public’False”). Some other scholars recognize that the law has some role
in the conduct of international trade relations, but emphasize the limitations of that role. See, e.g.,
C.F. Teese, A View from the Dress Circle in the Theatre of Trade Disputes, 5 WORLD ECON. 43, 51
(1982) (“[T]he GATT has been reduced from a legalistic instrument, designed to secure an open
trading system, to a document which in respect of some important rules acts only to exhort
governments not to intervene in international trade.”); Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and
the “Rule of Law”, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1985) (noting that one group of scholars believe
that “the principal value of the GATT is that it provides a process through which trade problems are
negotiated and compromised within a general framework of rules.”). For detailed discussions of the
two views, see Miquel Montana I Mora, A GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Politics in the Resolution of
International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 103, 109-11 (1993).
15. JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 340 (2d ed. 1997). Even Joost Pauwelyn, who emphasizes the role of
informal rules and standards in world trade, does not dispute the desirability of a rule-based trade
law system. His argument is only that informal rules and standards may better achieve the goals of a
rule-based trade law system in terms of predictability, stability, and neutrality. See Pauwelyn, supra
note 13, at 739-40.
16. Reich, supra note 13, at 781.
17. Id. at 780. See also JAN HOOGMARTENS, EC TRADE LAW FOLLOWING CHINA’S
ACCESSION TO THE WTO 10 (2004).
18. For discussions of the fundamental principles of the GATT and the WTO, see Principles
TRADE
ORG.
(2016),
of
the
Trading
System,
WORLD
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.
19. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From “Member-Driven Governance” to Constitutionally
Limited “Multilevel Trade Governance” in the WTO, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 86, 104-105 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds. 2006) (discussing the
importance of general principles of law in WTO jurisprudence).
20. Id. at 105.
21. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1994), Preamble [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
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Body has also endeavored to introduce and consistently apply certain basic
principles to the various WTO agreements.22
B. Protectionism
Free trade principles, however, are not the only underlying logic of trade
law. While free trade may enhance the economic welfare of the world as a
whole, it may also result in concentrated costs for certain segments of a society
that have outsized incentives to lobby against free trade.23 This requires trade
law to incorporate many policies that are protectionist in nature in order to
soften resistance from parties who would stand to lose from trade
liberalization.24
Protectionist considerations, therefore, become a constant feature of trade
law. Instead of unilaterally reducing trade barriers, which is supposedly in the
interests of the liberalizing countries even if other countries do not reciprocate,
GATT-WTO member countries wield trade barriers as bargaining chips that will
be given away only on a reciprocal basis.25 Specific examples of protectionist
policies can be found in the textile and agricultural sectors, where trade law has
deviated from rule-based principles to accommodate political needs.26 Examples
of protectionism are so numerous that Raj Bhala goes as far as arguing that there
is no such thing as free trade because “a careful read of any trade agreement
reveals . . . express carve-outs for certain preferred sectors, intricate and
protective rules of origin, lengthy phase-in periods for trade-liberalizing
obligations, and lengthy phase-out periods for trade barriers.”27
These two opposing considerations—free trade principles and
protectionism—create a fundamental tension in trade law. Protectionism stands
for the opposite of almost everything that free trade principles promote. Whereas
free trade principles liberalize trade, protectionism restricts it; whereas free trade

22. See Gabrielle Marceau, Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could
Do Better?, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 326,
326-33 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds. 2006).
23. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 27-28 (2d ed. 2001).
24. One example of such protectionist policies incorporated in trade law is antidumping,
which functions as a safety valve to alleviate pressures resulting from trade liberalization. See J.
Michael Finger et al., Antidumping As Safeguard Policy (World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2730, 2001) (discussing the weaknesses of antidumping as a safeguard mechanism);
Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 151, 163-67 (2012).
25. See Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace
Reputational Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 308 n.218 (2013); Sungjoon Cho & Claire R.
Kelly, Are World Trading Rules Passe? VA. J. INT’L L. 623, 632 (2013) (arguing that the basic
architecture of the GATT betrays a merchantilist nature because tariff reductions under the GATT
are based on reciprocal bargains).
26. See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformation: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1045, 1059 (2002).
27. Raj Bhala, Assessing the Modern Era of International Trade, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1647, 1657-58 (1998).

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38CS1Z
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principles disrupt existing trade patterns, protectionism preserves them; whereas
free trade principles value systemic coherence, protectionism favors ad hoc
solutions. As a practical matter, trade law becomes the compromise of these two
opposing considerations.28
II.
BALANCE DISRUPTED: TRADE LAW’S RESPONSES TO CHINA
The conceptualization of trade law as a balance between two opposing
considerations—free trade principles and protectionism—lays the basic
framework for analyzing trade law’s responses to the emergence of China as a
disruptive force in world trade. The exponential growth in Chinese exports dealt
a major external shock to the world trade system and dislodged trade law from
the delicate balance it managed to maintain prior to China’s rise. As will be
discussed in detail below, in almost all major areas where trade law authorizes
protective measures against import surges, including antidumping,
countervailing duties, safeguards, and managed trade, trade law tolerated
deviations from its own fundamental principles as a way of preserving the
structural stability of the world trade system. The discussions to follow
document such deviations and tell a story of trade law losing its balance in
response to a powerful, disruptive newcomer.
A. Antidumping
Arguably the most important trade-remedy instrument authorized by trade
law, antidumping provides a mechanism for an importing country to impose
special duties on imports from specific countries without violating the importing
country’s obligations under global trade rules.29 Article VI of GATT 1947
defines dumping as the introduction of one country’s products into the
commerce of another country at “less than the normal value” of the products.30
Article VI allows an importing country to levy an antidumping duty “not greater
in amount than the margin of dumping”31 if dumping “causes or threatens
material injury to an established industry” or “materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry” in the importing country.32 Subsequent to

28. Besides the free trade-versus-protectionism compromise, trade law could reflect
compromises along other dimensions as well. One compromise that has been the subject of intense
scholarly attention is the compromise between trade law and national sovereignty. See, e.g., John H.
Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the
Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157 (1997). This Article focuses on the freetrade-versus-protectionism compromise as it is most relevant for analyzing how trade law responded
to the rise of China.
29. For an overview of antidumping, see Zheng, supra note 24, at 159-81.
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33
I.L.M. 1153 (1994), art. VI:1 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
31. Id. art. VI:2.
32. Id. art. VI:1.
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GATT 1947, antidumping was further affirmed as a legitimate trade policy tool
in the 1967 and 1979 Antidumping Codes and then, upon the establishment of
the WTO in 1995, in the WTO Antidumping Agreement.33
The idea of antidumping itself is a compromise between free trade
principles and protectionism. The conventional rationale offered for
antidumping is that dumping is an unfair trade practice.34 This “unfair trade”
narrative, however, has been extensively critiqued in the academic literature as
lacking sound economic bases.35 Scholars have instead argued that antidumping
should be better viewed as a safety valve that allows importing countries to limit
the adverse impact of surging imports on domestic industries.36 Without this
safety valve, the logic goes, countries would be reluctant to make a free trade
commitment in the first place.37
Aruguably, therefore, antidumping is by design a protectionist tool aimed at
maintaining orderly trade, not free trade. The immediate goal of antidumping is
contrary to that of free trade, but in the grand scheme of trade policy,
antidumping is a necessary evil that must be tolerated for the sake of facilitating
free trade.38 To accomplish this higher goal, a delicate balance must be struck
where antidumping will be allowed to function, yet not to the extent that it
jeopardizes the rule-based world trade system.

33. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348,
T.I.A.S. 6431 [hereinafter 1967 Antidumping Code]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. 9650
[hereinafter 1979 Antidumping Code]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter WTO Antidumping Agreement].
34. See An Introduction to U.S. Trade Remedies, U.S. INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://enforcement.trade.gov/intro/ (last visited July 31, 2016) (characterizing antidumping as a law
that protects businesses from unfair competition resulting from unfair pricing by foreign companies).
35. See, e.g., John J. Barceló III, Antidumping Laws As Barriers to Trade—The United States
and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 502–13 (1972) (rejecting the
arguments that dumping is an “unfair trade practice,” confers an “artificial advantage,” “exploit[s]
monopoly power,” and “inflict[s] injurious adjustment costs”); Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping
Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 8-21 (1995) (criticizing the economic rationales of
antidumping); Reid M. Bolton, Antidumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-dumping Duties Under the
W.T.O. Through Heightened Scrutiny, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 66, 71–74 (2011) (rejecting various
economic justifications for antidumping); Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How
Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 357, 370–76 (2009)
(criticizing the “unfair trade” rationale of antidumping); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER
FIRE 162 (3d ed. 2009) (arguing that international price discrimination is neither unfair nor a
problem unless it harms competition).
36. See, e.g., Finger, supra note 24.
37. For discussions of antidumping as a safety valve, see Zheng, supra note 29, at 163-67.
38. See Luz Elena Reyes de la Torre & Jorge G. Gonzalez, Antidumping and Safeguard
Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization: The Mexican Case, in SAFEGUARDS AND
ANTIDUMPING IN LATIN AMERICAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE 205, 243 (J.
Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogues eds., 2006) (“On many occasions, high-ranking officials stated
that the trade defense system was a necessary evil, but that it should be kept under strict control
through its professionalization and the development of its methods and regulations.”).

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss2/3
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Trade law’s balancing act regarding antidumping was already difficult
enough before China upended the prevailing world trade order.39 With the
emergence of China as a major participant in world trade, the protectionist
element of antidumping has been stretched far and wide to mitigate the impact
of China, to a point that threatens the integrity of the rule-based world trade
system.40 As will be detailed below, the rise of China has accentuated tensions
between antidumping and global trade rules in two prominent respects: the use
of “surrogate values” in calculating antidumping duties and the resort to
country-wide antidumping duty rates.
1.

Surrogate Values

Under Article VI of the GATT, antidumping duties are calculated on the
basis of a comparison between the price at which the subject merchandise is sold
in the importing jurisdiction and the “normal value” of such merchandise.41
Dumping arises if the price of the product exported from one country to another
is less than “the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.”42 When the
home-market price of the product is unavailable, dumping arises if the price of
the product is less than “either . . . the highest comparable price for the like
product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or . . . the
cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable
addition for selling cost and profit.”43 Obviously, these provisions envision the
use of actual prices or costs of the allegedly dumped product in its home market
or third-country markets as the gauge of its normal value.
Drafters of the GATT, however, were well aware that actual prices or costs
would not provide a proper basis for comparison when such prices or costs were
not determined by market forces. In Ad Article VI,44 the GATT recognizes that
“in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the
State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability” for
39. Over the years, the world trade community has struggled to put constraints on the use of
antidumping for the sake of procedural fairness and predictability. For example, one issue that has
divided the world trade community is the issue of zeroing in antidumping—the practice of
artificially inflating dumping margins by treating negative dumping margins for product subgroups
as zero. See Chad Bown & Thomas J. Prusa, U.S. Antidumping: Much Ado about Zeroing (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5352), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/18139450-5352.
40. As discussed earlier, the strong consensus in the academic literature is that antidumping
lacks integrity at a fundamental level, given that what it purports to remedy is not unfair except in
very limited circumstances. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. VI:1(a).
42. Id.
43. Id. art. VI:1(b).
44. The “Ad” articles of the GATT are the interpretive notes accompanying the GATT
articles. See Carol J. Beyers, The U.S./Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: a Case Study of the GATT
and Environmental Progress, 16 MD. J. INT’L L. 229, 237 n.68 (1992).
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purposes of the dumping analysis.45 In such cases, Ad Article VI authorizes an
importing country to “take into account the possibility that a strict comparison
with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.”46 It does
not specify, however, exactly how to take this possibility into account, leaving
the door open to policy innovations on the part of GATT contracting parties.
Arguably, the GATT’s recognition of the need for special treatment of
imports from state-controlled economies makes logical sense. If antidumping
duties measure the underpricing of a product, they should not be based on homemarket prices artificially set by a government for “social and political
engineering” purposes.47 Otherwise, one effective way to circumvent
antidumping duties would be for a government to use its unlimited financial
power to set home-market prices at artificially low levels.48
The flexibility allowed under the GATT for imports from nonmarket
economies (NMEs) soon found its use in the Cold War era. Beginning in the
1960s, the U.S. Treasury Department, the agency responsible for antidumping
investigations in the United States at the time, began experimenting with a
special antidumping methodology for imports from the Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries.49 Rejecting the home market prices in those
countries as being state-controlled, the U.S. Treasury Department used the home
market or export prices of the same or similar products produced in countries
where the relevant product markets were not state-controlled, primarily Western
European countries, as the basis of comparison with U.S. prices in calculating
antidumping duties.50 This practice was subsequently recognized by section
205(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, which provided that the “foreign market
value”—the U.S. term at the time for “normal value”—of a product from a state-

45. GATT 1994, supra note 30, ad art. VI.
46. Id.
47. See Robert A. Anthony, The American Response to Dumping from Capitalist and
Socialist Economies—Substantive Premises, and Restructured Procedures After the 1967 GATT
Code, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 204 (1969) (“Prices in a ‘controlled’ economy are often the
instruments of social and political engineering, and may be set at artificial levels for reasons having
nothing to do with natural economic relationships as those would be judged in a free-market
economy.”).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 6657 (1960); Jalousie-LouvreSized Sheet Glass from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 8457 (1962); Portland Cement from Poland,
28 Fed. Reg. 6660 (1963); Window Glass from U.S.S.R., 29 Fed. Reg. 8381 (1964); Fur Felt Hoods,
Bodies, and Caps from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed. Reg. 15,024 (1966); Cast Iron Soil Pipe and Fittings
from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901, 8250 (1967); Pig Iron from East Germany, 33 Fed. Reg. 5105,
9375 (1968); Titanium Sponge from the U.S.S.R., 33 Fed. Reg. 5467, 5960, 6377 (1968).
50. Anthony, supra note 47, at 200-201. For more detailed descriptions of the Treasury
Department’s antidumping practices for imports from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European
countries in the 1960s, see Alexis C. Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Act
in Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 224-27 (1965); Comment, U.S. Trade
Laws Hinder the Development of U.S.-P.R.C. Trade, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 135, 146-49
(1983) [hereinafter U.S.-P.R.C. Trade]; Peter Buck Feller, The Antidumping Act and the East-West
Trade, 66 MICH. L. REV. 115, 126-33 (1967).
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controlled-economy country should be determined on the basis of either the
price at which the same or similar merchandise of a non-state-controlledeconomy country is sold for domestic consumption or exports to other countries,
or the constructed value of the same or similar merchandise in a non-statecontrolled-economy country.51
The sound logic of this surrogate-value approach, however, coincides with
a grave potential for unfair treatment. Producers from NME countries could
exert little control over the amount of antidumping duties imposed on their
products, given that it is not their own prices or costs, but prices or costs from
surrogate countries, that matter in the antidumping process.52
This potential for unfair treatment was most vividly on display in 1975 in
Electric Golf Cars from Poland, in which a Polish golf car manufacturer was
found to have dumped its products in the United States, first based on the sales
prices of a small Canadian producer53 and then later, based on the sales prices of
a U.S. producer.54 Using U.S. producers’ prices as the basis of normal value
effectively barred the import of these products, as imported products would have
to be sold at a higher price than the same or similar U.S. products when
transportation costs are taken into account.55
The nonsensical outcome in Electric Golf Cars from Poland prompted the
U.S. Treasury Department to rectify the most unreasonable elements of its
surrogate-country methodology by promulgating a new antidumping regulation
in 1978.56 The 1978 regulation prioritized the use of prices or constructed values
from third countries whose stages of economic development were comparable to
that of the exporting state-controlled-economy country.57 When the foreign
market value of the allegedly dumped product had to be constructed from the
costs of producing the product, the 1978 regulation required that the actual
amounts of the factors of production incurred by the specific NME producer in
producing the product be used in calculating the constructed value, although
such factors of production would still be valued using prices taken from
surrogate countries.58 These provisions reduced the arbitrariness inherent in the
51. See Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978 (repealed, Trade Agreements Act of
1979, Pub. L. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144). For more discussions of section 205(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974, see Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Polish
Golf Cart Case and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PENN. L. REV. 217, 224-27 (1979)
[hereinafter Dumping by SCE Countries].
52. See id. at 224-25.
53. See Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497, 25497 (1975).
54. See Letter from Carl W. Schwarz, Counsel for Melex USA, Inc., to Representative
Charles A. Vanik, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means
(Apr. 27, 1979), reprinted in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 734, 735 (1979).
55. See Dumping by SCE Countries, supra note 51, at 229.
56. See 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262, 35265 (Aug. 9, 1978).
57. 19 C.F.R. § 153.7(b) (1979) (setting forth a hierarchy of three alternative methods for
measuring the foreign market value of merchandise from state-controlled-economy countries).
58. 19 C.F.R. § 153.7(c). The 1978 regulation used the term “specific objective components
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NME methodology and, for the first time, granted NME producers some limited
abilities to predict and control their antidumping exposure.
It was against this backdrop that China came on the antidumping scene. In
the late 1970s, shortly after China embarked on its ambitious economic reform
programs, trade between China and Western countries began to increase
rapidly.59 In 1981, in Natural Menthol from China, the first-ever antidumping
action filed in the United States against a Chinese product, the U.S. Commerce
Department (USDOC) 60 rejected Chinese domestic menthol prices as a
benchmark for measuring antidumping duties for Chinese menthol exported to
the United States because the Chinese prices were state-controlled.61 In so
doing, the USDOC entertained, but eventually rejected, the Chinese
respondents’ argument that China’s state control in the particular economic
sector in question—the agricultural sector—was not to such an extent that would
disqualify Chinese menthol prices from being considered in antidumping
investigations.62 The USDOC then went on to use prices of menthol exported
from Paraguay to the United States as the basis for calculating antidumping
duties for Chinese menthol.63 Subsequent to the Chinese menthol case, in the
1980s, the USDOC routinely treated China as a state-controlled-economy
country and used prices from surrogate countries to calculate antidumping duties
for Chinese products.64
By then, however, China did not appear to be receiving a higher level of
scrutiny from antidumping authorities than other state-controlled-economy
countries, to which the same surrogate-country methodology was regularly
applied.65 After all, as of the 1980s, China’s potential as a disruptive force in

or factors of production” to refer to the actual amounts of the factors of production used in producing
the allegedly dumped product. See id.
59. The volume of bilateral trade between China and the United States, for example, increased
from $374 million in 1977 to $5.49 billion in 1981. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE
ADMIN., FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES—CHINA,
FET 82-112 (1982).
60. In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter transferred the responsibility for conducting
antidumping investigations from the Treasury Department to the Commerce Department. See
William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other “Nonmarket Economy”
Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 88 n.51 (1987).
61. See Antidumping, Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China; Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 24614, 24614 (Dep’t of Comm. May
1, 1981) [hereinafter Chinese Menthol Final USDOC Determination].
62. See Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China; Antidumping—Preliminary
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Suspension of Liquidation, 46 Fed. Reg. 3258,
3258-60 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 14, 1981) [hereinafter Chinese Menthol Preliminary USDOC
Determination].
63. See Chinese Menthol Final USDOC Determination, supra note 61, at 24,614.
64. The countries that were used as China’s surrogate included Thailand, the Dominican
Republic, Colombia, Pakistan, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, and Spain. See Alford,
supra note 59, at 89.
65. Id.
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world trade was not fully visible, obviating any need for aggressive,
nonconventional antidumping policy aimed specifically at China.
During the late 1980s, with no NME countries posing an existential threat
to the world trade order,66 the constant tug-of-war between free trade principles
and protectionism within trade law continued to tip in the direction of the former
in the area of NME methodology. In the United States, the 1988 Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act modified the NME methodology used by the USDOC,
making the constructed value of the factors of production of the NME product
the preferred method of measuring the normal value of the product.67 Only when
the information necessary for calculating the constructed value of the factors of
production was unavailable would the USDOC be allowed to measure the
normal value of the NME product on the basis of the price at which the same or
similar product was sold in a surrogate country. 68
In implementing the new NME methodology under the 1988 law for
Chinese producers, the USDOC initially showed much greater flexibility than
the statute required. In 1991, in Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the
People’s Republic of China, the USDOC adopted a “mix-and-match” approach
for NME prices and stated that if it could be established that inputs purchased in
an NME were purchased at market-oriented prices, such actual prices might be
substituted for surrogate-country values in the factors-of-production analysis.69
Later in the same year, in Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic
of China, the USDOC again confirmed the mix-and-match approach, stating that
“for certain inputs into the production process, market forces may be at work.”70
That would be the case, according to the USDOC, if inputs were imported from
suppliers in market economy countries, or if market forces were at work “in
determining the prices for locally-sourced goods in the nonmarket economy.”71
In these cases, the USDOC believed that “it is appropriate to use those prices in
lieu of values of a surrogate, market-economy producer, because they are
market-driven prices and they reflect the producer’s actual experience.”72 In an
implicit admission to the drawbacks of the surrogate-country method, the
USDOC further stated that “[t]here is nothing to be gained in terms of accuracy,

66. During this time period, the country perceived to be posing the largest threat to the
existing world trade order was Japan, which, despite its hierarchical economic structures, was not
considered an NME country.
67. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(1989).
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2) .
69. Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg.
25,664, 25,667 (Dep’t of Comm. Jun. 5, 1991) (preliminary determinations of sales at less than fair
value).
70. Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,153,
46,154 (Dep’t of Comm. Sept. 10, 1991) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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fairness, or predictability in using surrogate values when market-determined
values exists in the NME country.”73
The USDOC’s push to rationalize the surrogate-value method, however,
led to tensions between antidumping and another area of trade law—
countervailing duty law. A parallel trade remedy instrument authorized under
global trade rules, countervailing duty law allows an importing country to
impose special countervailing duties on imported products to offset subsidies
conferred by foreign governments on such products.74 Prior to the 1990s, the
USDOC took the position that a subsidy was “any action that distorts or subverts
the market process and results in a misallocation of resources.”75 Because
markets were fictitious in NME countries in the first place, subsidies “have no
meaning” in such countries.76 But when the USDOC began recognizing some
prices in China as being driven by market forces, United States petitioners
wasted no time in reviving the argument that countervailing duty law should
begin to apply to Chinese products in market-oriented sectors.77
Apparently reluctant to change its long-standing practice of not applying
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs, the USDOC retreated from
using actual Chinese prices as the comparison basis in antidumping. In Sulfanilic
Acid from the People’s Republic of China in 1992, the USDOC announced three
criteria for determining whether an NME producer operates within a marketoriented industry in the NME: (1) there must be virtually no government
involvement in setting prices or amounts to be produced for the merchandise
under investigation; (2) the industry producing the merchandise under
investigation should be characterized by private or collective ownership; and (3)
market-determined prices must be paid for “all significant inputs, whether
material or non-material, and for an all but insignificant proportion of all the
inputs accounting for the total value of the merchandise under investigation.”78
If these conditions were not met, the producer would be treated as an NME
producer and surrogate prices or costs from third countries would be used to
calculate the normal value of the merchandise under investigation.79 Once the
NME producer failed this market-oriented-industry test, the USDOC would
effectively no longer grant requests to evaluate whether individual inputs used
73. Id.
74. See GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. VI:3.
75. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19375 (Dep’t of Comm. May
7, 1984) (final negative countervailing duty determination).
76. Id. (“It is this fundamental distinction—that in an NME system the government does not
interfere in the market process, but supplants it—that has led us to conclude that subsidies have no
meaning outside the context of a market economy.”).
77. See Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg.
57,616 (Dep’t of Comm. Nov. 13, 1991) (initiation of countervailing duty investigations); Chrome
Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 877 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 9,
1992) (initiation of countervailing duty investigations).
78. Sulfanilic Acid from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 9409, 9411 (Dep’t of
Comm. Mar. 18, 1992) (preliminary determination of sales at less than fair value).
79. Id.
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by the producer were sourced from within the NME in accordance with market
principles.80 In so doing, the USDOC ushered in an all-or-nothing approach to
replace the mix-and-match approach it used only months before in Oscillating
Fans and Ceiling Fans and Chrome Plated Lug Nuts.
After abandoning the mix-and-match approach, the USDOC moved to
terminate the pending countervailing duty proceedings against Chinese
producers, on the grounds that the Chinese industries in question were not
market-oriented.81 For the next twenty-five years, antidumping would become
the sole remedy against low-priced Chinese imports.82 In the meantime, the
USDOC strictly applied the market-oriented industry test in antidumping
proceedings involving Chinese products, resulting in a de facto rule under which
surrogate values were used for all Chinese producers.
For the time being, the USDOC managed to defuse a crisis in trade law as it
applied to China. One could disagree with the USDOC about the soundness of
its judgment that Chinese industries were still not market-oriented despite
progress in market reforms in China. But, at least the USDOC’s policy towards
China was internally consistent. If market forces were not strong enough in
China to allow Chinese prices to be used as the comparison basis in
antidumping, they should not be strong enough to give rise to subsidies, which
are a meaningful concept only if there are real markets to deviate from. At the
time, the USDOC was able to rely on antidumping as the exclusive remedy for
Chinese imports in part because in the early 1990s, the level of import protection
offered by antidumping—with the help of the surrogate-value method—was
adequate to cope with China’s burgeoning, yet still not dominating, export
prowess. This would change twenty-five years later, when China’s threat to the
global trade order and the pressure to counteract it were in full swing.83 As
80. In Sulfanilic Acid, the Chinese respondent argued that the prices at which it purchased
some of its inputs were not subject to state control and were market driven. Id. The USDOC rejected
this argument by citing the lack of documentary evidence indicating that market forces were at work
for those inputs. Id. Subsequently, in its amended final determination in Chrome Plated Lug Nuts in
response to court remand, the USDOC made clear that once it was shown that one significant input
was not purchased at a market-determined price, “there [was] no need to reach a similar
determination with respect to any other significant inputs.” Chrome Plated Lug Nuts, 57 Fed. Reg.
15,052, 15053 (Dep’t of Comm. Apr. 24, 1992) (amendment to final determination of sales at less
than fair value and amendment to antidumping order).
81. See Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg.
24,018, 24019 (Dep’t of Comm. Jun. 5, 1992) (final negative countervailing duty determinations)
(“Therefore, we have determined that the PRC fan industry is not an MOI. As a result, we determine
that the CVD law cannot be applied to the PRC fan industry.”); Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel
Locks from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,459, 10460 (Dep’t of Comm. Mar. 26,
1992) (rescission of initiation of countervailing duty investigation and dismissal of petition) (“[W]e
determine that the PRC producers of lug nuts are nonmarket economy producers to which the
countervailing duty law cannot be applied.”).
82. This changed in 2007, when the USDOC applied countervailing duty law to Chinese
products, citing changes that occurred in the Chinese economy. See infra Part II.B.1 for more
discussions.
83. The trade deficit of the United States with China grew to $258 billion in 2007. See Trade
in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 04, 2014),
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discussed in more detail below, escalating protectionist pressures eventually
resulted in a more dramatic response to Chinese exports, a response that entailed
the simultaneous imposition of antidumping duties calculated using the NME
methodology and countervailing duties on Chinese products at the expense of
trade law’s internal logic and coherence.84
The use of surrogate values in antidumping proceedings involving Chinese
products has been sanctioned by global trade rules. Upon the establishment of
the WTO in 1994, global trade rules inherited the basic framework laid under
the GATT for handling antidumping for NME producers. The WTO
Antidumping Agreement, enacted to interpret and implement Article VI of the
GATT, contained no explicit references to the use of surrogate values for
imports from NME countries.85 Therefore, Ad Article VI of the GATT 1947,
which was now incorporated into the GATT 1994, remained the only explicit
provision in the WTO’s founding legal documents on the surrogate-value issue.
The absence of the surrogate-value issue in the WTO Antidumping Agreement
indicates that by 1994, WTO members perhaps did not consider the threats from
NME countries to be grave enough to warrant heightened attention to the
surrogate-value issue, given that the communist regimes in the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe collapsed several years earlier and that China’s
export machines were just beginning to rev up.
This changed when China gained WTO membership in 2001, by which
time China’s surging exports, along with the prospect of even greater market
access afforded by WTO membership, forced existing WTO members to
explicitly authorize the use of surrogate values for Chinese products in China’s
WTO accession documents. Paragraph 15(a) of the China Accession Protocol
states that “[i]n determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT
1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use
either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a
methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or
costs in China.”86 Paragraph 15(a)(ii) further provides that the use of nonChinese prices or costs would be allowed if “the producers under investigation
cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry
producing the like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of
that product.”87 Paragraph 15(a)(ii), however, is set to expire fifteen years after
the date of China’s accession.88

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
84. See infra Part II.B.1.
85. See Chad P. Bown & Petros C. Mavroidis, One (Firm) Is Not Enough: A Legal-Economic
Analysis of EC-Fasteners, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 243, 255 (2013).
86. Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Decision of 10 November 2001, WT/L/432
(Nov. 23, 2001), art. 15(a) [hereinafter China Accession Protocol].
87. Id. art. 15(a)(ii).
88. Id. art. 15(d). There are fierce debates on the legal consequences of the expiration of
Paragraph 15(a)(ii). See infra notes 291-297 and accompanying text.
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Like Ad Article VI of the GATT, Paragraph 15(a) of the China Accession
Protocol only states that surrogate values could be used for Chinese products,
but does not elaborate on how they should be used. The lack of specifics in the
GATT and the China Accession Protocol affords WTO member countries wide
latitude in the use of surrogate values and therefore preserves flexible policy
space for handling antidumping for Chinese imports. In 2011, a WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel affirmed this flexible policy space in EU-Footwear. In this
case China challenged the European Commission’s surrogate-country selection
procedure and its selection of Brazil as the surrogate country for antidumping
investigations involving imports of Chinese footwear.89 Because there are no
WTO rules on the procedure or criteria for the selection of a surrogate country,90
China could only assert that the European Union’s surrogate-country selection
procedure violated its general obligations under other WTO provisions. In
particular, China claimed that the EU had violated Article 2.4 of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement, which requires a “fair comparison” between the
export price and the normal value in calculating antidumping duties.91 The WTO
Panel rejected this argument, stating that Article 2.4 of the WTO Antidumping
Agreement only concerns the comparison of the export price and the normal
value after the component elements of the comparison have already been
established. 92
2.

Country-Wide Rates

In addition to the use of surrogate values, the protectionist pressures to
contain China’s exports in the multilateral trading system led to another policy
innovation by importing countries: the use of country-wide, instead of companyspecific, antidumping duty rates. As discussed below, this policy innovation,
when coupled with the use of adverse facts available, results in much higher
antidumping rates, effectively serving the protectionist needs of importing
countries. However, the policy innovation has a tenuous legal basis in trade law.
As discussed below, China successfully challenged the use of country-wide
antidumping rates for its products before the WTO as being inconsistent with
WTO rules. When asked to choose between preserving the integrity of the rule89. See Report of the Panel, European Union-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear
from China, WT/DS405/R (Oct. 28, 2011). The European Commission selected Brazil as the
surrogate country in the underlying investigations despite the Chinese parties’ argument that
Thailand, India, or Indonesia would be a more suitable surrogate country than Brazil. See id. ¶¶
7.254-.255.
90. China Accession Protool, supra note 86, ¶ 7.258.
91. Id. ¶ 7.261. China argued that this “fair comparison” requirement is an independent
obligation that applies to all aspects of the establishment of normal value, including the selection of
a surrogate country. Id.
92. Id. ¶ 7.263 (“[I]t is clear that the requirement to make a fair comparison in Article 2.4
logically presupposes that normal value and export price, the elements to be compared, have already
been established.”). The WTO Panel also rejected China’s other arguments that the EU’s surrogatecountry selection procedure violated Articles 2.1 and 17.6(1) of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
See id. ¶¶ 7.259-.260.
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based world trade system and granting sufficient policy leeway to protect the
status quo, the WTO opted for the former.
By way of background, Article 6.10 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement
requires that “[antidumping] authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual
margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the
product under investigation.”93 The authorities may deviate from this
requirement if “the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of
products involved is so large as to make such a determination impracticable.”94
In such cases, the authorities are allowed to “limit their examination either to a
reasonable number of interested parties or products by using samples . . . , or to
the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question
which can reasonably be investigated.”95
In the late 1980s—a period that predated the WTO Antidumping
Agreement—United States petitioners began making the argument that a
country-wide antidumping duty rate should be assigned to Chinese producers or
exporters who could not demonstrate an absence of government control over
their business operations. In Certain Headwear from the People’s Republic of
China in 1989, for example, the U.S. petitioner argued that the Chinese
government owned all trading companies in China and the establishment of
company-specific rates with large variations “facilitates circumvention in a
state-controlled economy where exports can be easily directed and diverted
among the trading companies by the State.”96 The USDOC rejected this
argument, stating that “[t]he former branches of the national trading companies
have separated from the national companies and we found no evidence that the
prices the branches charge for exports to the United States are set by or
coordinated through the national trading companies.”97 The USDOC also noted
that in past antidumping investigations, it always calculated separate rates for
different Chinese national trading companies even though it treated China as a
state-controlled economy.98
In 1991, however, the USDOC made an about-face on the separate-rate
issue and denied, for the first time, a request for separate rates by Chinese
exporters. In Heavy Forged Hand Tools from the People’s Republic of China,
the USDOC assigned one country-wide antidumping rate to three Chinese
exporters that were former branches of a Chinese national trading company.99
93. WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 33, art. 6.10.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Certain Headwear from the People’s Republic of China, 54 Fed. Reg. 11983, 11986
(Dep’t of Comm. Mar. 23, 1989) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Shop Towels from the People’s Republic of China; Final Results of
Administrative Review of Antidumping Duty Order (50 FR 26020, June 24, 1985)).
99. See Heavy Forged Hand Tools, Finished or Unfinished, With or Without Handles, from
the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 241, 244 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 3, 1991) (final
determinations of sales at less than fair value).
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The USDOC asserted that the Chinese national trading company in question
failed to submit adequate documentation of its claim that the three exporters
were independent corporations.100 This failure, according to the USDOC, left
“no alternative than to treat the three as branches of the same exporting
entity.”101
Shortly afterwards, the USDOC doubled-down on its denial of separate
rates for Chinese exporters. In Iron Construction Castings from the People’s
Republic of China, the USDOC assigned one country-wide antidumping rate to
two exporters that were former branches of another Chinese national trading
company.102 The assignment of a country-wide rate in this case is all the more
striking as it reversed the USDOC’s preliminary decision in the same case to
calculate separate rates for the two exporters.103 More significantly, the USDOC
broadly stated in this case that in a state-controlled economy, “all entities are
presumed to export under the control of the state” and this presumption can be
rebutted only by “a clear showing of legal, financial and economic
independence.”104
Later in the same year, in Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China,
the USDOC elaborated on its criteria for separate rates for exporters from NME
countries.105 To qualify for company-specific rates, exporters from NME
countries have to pass a two-pronged test by demonstrating “an absence of
central government control, both in law and in fact, with respect to exports.”106
For each of the two prongs of the test—referred to by the USDOC as “de jure
absence of control” and “de facto absence of control”—the USDOC set forth a
list of evidence supporting, but not requiring, a finding of absence of central
control.107
100. Id. The Chinese national trading company in question claimed that it was divided into
seven independent corporations pursuant to a government order. The USDOC repeatedly requested a
copy of the government order or other official Chinese government documentation at the time of or
prior to the date of the order. The national trading company never submitted such documentation.
See id.
101. Id.
102. See Iron Construction Castings from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 2742,
2744 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 24, 1991) (Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review).
103. See id. at 2743-44. The USDOC stated that after it made its preliminary decision to assign
separate rates to the two exporters, “[s]ubsequent review of the information on the record has led us
to reevaluate the claims made by [the two exporters] with respect to separation and independence
from the national corporation.” Id. at 2743. This reevaluation found no information on the record
indicating that “the national import/export corporations are independent from one another.” Id at
2744.
104. Id.
105. See Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,588, 20,589 (Dep’t of
Comm. May 6, 1991) (Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value).
106. Id.
107. According to the USDOC:
Evidence supporting, though not requiring, a finding of de jure absence of central
control includes: (1) An absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an
individual exporter’s business and export licenses; (2) any legislative enactments
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By now, the USDOC’s rejection of separate rates for Chinese companies
had progressed from a facts-based decision for specific companies to a
presumed norm for all Chinese entities. From this point on, all Chinese
companies, regardless of whether they had been historically part of the same
national trading company, had to overcome the presumption of central
government control in order to obtain separate antidumping rates.108
Ironically, the move towards country-wide antidumping rates for Chinese
companies took place at a time when China was undergoing rapid economic
reforms that conferred higher degrees of independence from the government on
Chinese firms.109 Arguably, the adoption of country-wide antidumping rates for
Chinese products comports not with economic principles, but with protectionist
policy needs. In calculating country-wide antidumping rates, the USDOC often
relies on information provided by petitioners and inferences adverse to
respondents.110 As a result, country-wide antidumping rates tend to be much

decentralizing control of companies; or (3) any other formal measures by the
government decentralizing control of companies. De facto absence of central
government control with respect to exports is based on two prerequisites: (1) Whether
each exporter sets its own export prices independently of the government and other
exporters; and (2) whether each exporter can keep the proceeds from its sales.
Id.
108. Subsequent to Sparklers, the USDOC tinkered with its separate-rate criteria as applied to
Chinese companies. In Certain Compact Ductile Iron Waterworks Fittings and Accessories Thereof
from the People’s Republic of China in 1993, the USDOC determined that state ownership per se
precluded a finding of absence of government control. See 58 Fed. Reg. 37,908, 37,909 (Dep’t of
Comm. Jul. 14, 1993) (Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value). According to the
USDOC, “an entity cannot be completely free of central government control with respect to exports
if it is owned by the central government, regardless of whether the indicia set forth in Sparklers have
been met.” This deviation from the Sparklers test, however, was short-lived. In Silicon Carbide from
the People’s Republic of China in 1994, the USDOC changed course and determined that “the
ownership of [respondent companies] ‘by all the people,’ in and of itself, cannot be considered as
dispositive in determining whether those companies can receive separate rates.” 59 Fed. Reg.
22,585, 22,586 (Dep’t of Comm. May 2, 1994) (Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value). Therefore, a Chinese respondent could still receive a separate rate “if it establishes on a
de jure and de facto basis that there is an absence of governmental control.” Id. at 22,587. The
USDOC then amplified the Sparklers test by adding two factors to the de facto analysis: (1) whether
the respondent has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements, and (2) whether
the respondent has autonomy from the central government in making decisions regarding selection
of management. Id. For more detailed discussions of the evolution of the USDOC’s separate-rate
methodology, see Priya Alagiri, Reform, Reality, and Recognition: Reassessing U.S. Antidumping
Policy Toward China, 26 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1061, 1068-79 (1995).
109. See Alagiri, supra note 108, at 1082-85 (discussing changes in the Chinese economy in
1989-1994); see also Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition,
Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 652-54, 662-67 (2010) (discussing
price liberalization and reforms of state-owned enterprises in China).
110. For Chinese respondents that have not demonstrated an absence of central government
control, the USDOC relies on the Chinese government to identify them and to submit a consolidated
questionnaire response on their behalf. But it is difficult for the Chinese government to persuade all
exporters of the subject merchandise to provide information needed for the consolidated
questionnaire response. See Alagiri, supra note 108, at 1068. The USDOC may base the countrywide antidumping rate on adverse facts available when some exporters that are part of the NMEwide entity do not respond to the antidumping questionnaire. See 2015 Antidumping Manual, U.S.
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higher than company-specific antidumping rates. According to a 2006 study by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the USDOC imposed antidumping
duties on the same product from both China and one or more market-economy
countries in twenty-five cases.111 The average antidumping rate applied to
Chinese companies in the twenty-five cases was over twenty percent higher than
the average rate applied to market-economy companies.112 Much of this
difference is attributable to the unusually high country-wide rates for Chinese
companies. While company-specific rates for Chinese companies were similar to
those assigned to market-economy companies, country-wide rates for Chinese
companies were over sixty percent higher than comparable market-economy
rates.113
The main problem with country-wide antidumping rates, however, is that
their legal basis is questionable. In 2009, China mounted its first attack on
country-wide antidumping rates before the WTO in European CommunitiesDefinitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from
China (EC-Fasteners).114 China argued, among other things, that the European
Union’s imposition of country-wide antidumping rates on Chinese products
solely because China is an NME country violated the EU’s obligations under the
WTO Antidumping Agreement and other WTO agreements.115
By way of background, the European Union operates an antidumping
scheme similar to the country-wide antidumping rate scheme in place in the
United States. Article 9(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30
November 2009 (EU Basic Antidumping Regulations) provides that when a
supplier is from an NME country, the antidumping authority will specify an
antidumping duty for the entire supplying country unless the supplier can
demonstrate sufficient independence from the government.116 This is often
referred to as the “Individual Treatment” test in EU antidumping law.117

DEPARTMENT
OF
COMMERCE
IMPORT
ADMINISTRATION
at
7
(2015),
http://enforcement.trade.gov/admanual/2015/Chapter%2010%20NME.pdf.
111. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE:
ELIMINATING NONMARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY WOULD LOWER ANTIDUMPING DUTIES FOR
SOME CHINESE COMPANIES 16 (2006).
112. Id. at 19.
113. Id. at 20-21.
114. See Request for Consultation, European Communities-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures
on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/1 (Aug. 4, 2009).
115. Id. at 1-2.
116. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on Protection Against
Dumped Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Community, Art. 9(5) [hereinafter
EU Basic Antidumping Regulations]. To receive company-specific rates, NME suppliers must
demonstrate that:
“(a) in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures, exporters are
free to repatriate capital and profits;
(b) export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely
determined;
(c) the majority of the shares belong to private persons; state officials appearing on the
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In EC-Fasteners, the WTO Appellate Body addressed the compatibility of
the EU’s Individual Treatment test with relevant WTO provisions, particularly
Article 6.10 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. The Appellate Body
examined the language of Article 6.10 and concluded that the use of the terms
“shall” and “as a rule” in the first sentence of Article 6.10 expresses a
mandatory obligation, not a mere preference, to determine company-specific
dumping margins.118 This obligation, according to the Appellate Body, is
subject only to the exception to use sampling as provided for in the second
sentence of Article 6.10 and additional exceptions allowed in other WTO
agreements.119 The Appellate Body found no provisions in relevant WTO
agreements that would allow a WTO member to depart from the obligation to
determine company-specific dumping margins only with respect to imports from
NMEs.120 In particular, the Appellate Body rejected the EU’s efforts to justify
its country-wide antidumping rate scheme under Article 15(d) of the China
Accession Protocol. The Appellate Body concluded that while Article 15 of the
China Accession Protocol establishes special rules regarding the use of surrogate
values, “it does not contain an open-ended exception that allows WTO Members
to treat China differently for other purposes under the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and the GATT 1994, such as the determination of export prices or individual
versus country-wide margins and duties.”121 The Appellate Body finally found
that the EU’s Individual Treatment test, as provided for in Article 9(5) of the EU
Basic Antidumping Regulations, is inconsistent with Article 6.10 of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement because “it conditions the determination of individual
dumping margins for and the imposition of individual anti-dumping duties on
NME exporters or producers to the fulfilment of the [Individual Treatment]
test.”122
The Appellate Body’s ruling on country-wide antidumping rates in ECFasteners rejected a long-standing practice that was essential to keeping

board of directors or holding key management positions shall either be in minority or
it must be demonstrated that the company is nonetheless sufficiently independent from
State interference;
(d) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; and
(e) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual
exporters are given different rates of duty.”
Id.
117. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Petros C. Mavroidis, One (Firm) is Not Enough: A LegalEconomic Analysis of EC-Fasteners, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 243, 244 (2013).
118. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R (Jul. 15, 2011), ¶¶ 31517 [hereinafter EC-Fasteners AB Report].
119. Id. ¶ 320.
120. Id. ¶ 328.
121. Id. ¶ 290.
122. Id. ¶ 385. The Appellate Body also addressed the compatibility of Article 9(5) of the EU
Basic Antidumping Regulations with other WTO provisions, such as Article 9.2 of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement and Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. See id. ¶¶ 330-54, 386-98.
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antidumping duties high for Chinese products.123 What prompted the Appellate
Body to take this dramatic step appears to be the fact that the relevant WTO
provisions on this issue are relatively clear. The way the provisions were drafted
simply does not allow for the calculation of country-wide antidumping rates
merely because the suppliers are from NME countries.124 To hold otherwise in
the face of such textual clarity would strain the credibility of the rule-based
world trade system. In the perpetual tug-of-war between free trade principles
and protectionism, the former won an important battle.125
B. Countervailing Duty Law
Besides antidumping, another area of trade law that has seen constant
tussles between free trade principles and protectionism in the face of China’s
threats to the existing world trade order is countervailing duty law. Due to
concerns about the systemic coherence of trade law, the United States had
resisted the idea of applying countervailing duty law to Chinese products, until
the level of protection offered by antidumping alone became inadequate to cope
with surging imports from China. The application of countervailing duty law to
Chinese products raises a host of thorny issues, including the potential doublecounting of subsidies, the determination of whether a firm is a “public body”
capable of conferring subsidies, and the use of cross-border benchmarks in
measuring the magnitudes of subsidies. As discussed below, the WTO’s
handling of these issues further disturbed the already delicate balance struck by
trade law with respect to China.
1.

To Countervail or to Not Countervail?

As a threshold matter, the basic WTO rules governing countervailing
duties—Article VI of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)—place no limitations on the reach
of countervailing duty law. However, the USDOC, the U.S. agency responsible
for assessing antidumping and countervailing duties, initially chose not to apply
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs. In 1984, the USDOC laid out its

123. For the importance of country-wide antidumping rates to antidumping authorities, see
supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
124. It is not clear why the use of country-wide antidumping rates for Chinese companies,
which predated China’s entry into the WTO, was not explicitly recognized and sanctioned in the
China Accession Protocol. As the Appellate Body in EC-Fasteners observed, Paragraph 15 of the
China Accession Protocol only concerns the use of surrogate values, not the use of country-wide
antidumping rates, for Chinese companies. The failure to explicitly provide for a central
antidumping tool in China’s Accession Protocol is likely an oversight on the part of Western trade
negotiators and treaty drafters.
125. In June 2012, the European Union implemented the Appellate Body’s findings in DS397
with respect to country-wide antidumping rates by eliminating the presumption of non-independence
from the state for producers from NME countries. See Regulation (EU) No. 765/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R0765.
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position on countervailing duties for NME countries in Carbon Steel Wire Rod
from Poland.126 The USDOC asserted that subsidies, which it defined as “any
action that distorts or subverts the market process and results in a misallocation
of resources,”127 were a meaningless concept in NME countries because those
countries had no market processes to be distorted or subverted to begin with.128
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld this determination in
the landmark case of Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States in 1986.129 After
examining the purpose of countervailing duty law, the nature of nonmarket
economies, and the action Congress had taken in other statutes that specifically
addressed the question of imports from NMEs, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the economic incentives and benefits provided by the NMEs in question for
exports to the United States did not constitute subsidies within the meaning of
U.S. countervailing duty law. 130
As discussed in Part II.A.1 above, in the early 1990s, the USDOC briefly
recognized some Chinese domestic prices as market-driven and therefore used
them for price comparisons in antidumping proceedings. The USDOC was then
confronted with the question of whether the same market forces it recognized as
being present in China should lead to the conclusion that countervailing duty
law should be applied to China.131 The USDOC eventually said no to this
question, and opted to reverse its uses of actual Chinese prices in antidumping
for the sake of trade law’s internal coherence.132
Arguably, the USDOC was able to withstand pressure to impose
countervailing duties on Chinese products on top of antidumping duties in the
1980s and early 1990s because such pressure was not severe enough at the time.
Fast forwarding twenty-five years, when U.S. petitioners tried again to impose
countervailing duties on Chinese products, the USDOC changed course. In a
2007 policy memorandum, the USDOC examined whether the analytical
elements of the Federal Circuit’s Georgetown Steel decision were still applicable
to China’s present-day economy.133 The USDOC stated that China’s economy at
the time was “significantly different” from the Soviet-style economies at issue in
Georgetown Steel.134 China’s economy was more flexible, said the USDOC,

126. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (Dep’t of Comm. May 7, 1984)
(final negative countervailing duty determination).
127. Id. at 19, 375.
128. Id.
129. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
130. Id. at 1313-18.
131. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
133. See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia & Lawrence Norton, Office of Policy, Import
Admin., to David M. Spooner, Asst. Sec’y, Import Admin., Countervailing Duty Investigation of
Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China–Whether the Analytical Elements of
the Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy (Mar. 29, 2007)
[hereinafter Georgetown Steel Memo].
134. Id. at 4.
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than the Soviet-style economies in terms of the power to set wages and prices,
access to foreign currency, personal property rights and private
entrepreneurship, foreign trading rights, and allocation of financial resources.135
As a result, the USDOC concluded that “it is possible to determine whether the
PRC Government has bestowed a benefit upon a Chinese producer (i.e., the
subsidy can be identified and measured) and whether any such benefit is
specific.” 136
It could be argued that the USDOC’s decision to apply countervailing duty
law to China was based on principles, not on expediency. After all, it is
undeniable that China’s economy in 2007 had undergone dramatic
transformations since the 1980s. The policy of not applying countervailing duty
law to NMEs—a policy rooted in the conceptualization of NMEs as Soviet-style
economies—arguably no longer reflected China’s economic reality.
What made the USDOC’s move problematic, however, is that while the
USDOC recognized market forces in China for countervailing duty purposes, it
continually refused to recognize market forces in China for antidumping
purposes. In 2006, in its latest assessment of whether China should continue to
be designated as an NME, the USDOC determined that “market forces in China
are not yet sufficiently developed to permit the use of prices and costs in that
country for purposes of the Department’s dumping analysis.”137 A year later, in
its Georgetown Steel memorandum, which concluded that countervailing duty
law now applied to China, the USDOC acknowledged that “[t]he features and
characteristics of China’s present-day economy also suggest that modification of
some aspects of the Department’s current NME antidumping policy and practice
may be warranted, such as the conditions under which the Department might
grant an NME respondent market economy treatment.”138 In 2007, the USDOC
issued requests for public comments on how it might be able to grant marketeconomy treatment to individual Chinese respondents in antidumping
proceedings.139 These requests for comments, however, have not resulted in any
concrete action on the part of the USDOC. As such, the USDOC’s policy
towards China is caught in an obvious contradiction: Market forces in China are
considered strong enough for subsidies to be identified and measured, but not
strong enough for Chinese domestic prices or costs to be used as the basis of
135. Id. at 5-9.
136. Id. at 10. After determining that the Chinese government had granted a subsidy, the
USDOC could then potentially apply countervailing duty law to Chinese imports.
137. Shauna Lee-Alaia et al., Imp. Admin., Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Lined
Paper Products from the People’s Republic of China (China)—China’s Status as a Non-Market
Economy (NME) 4 (2006), http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-lined-papermemo-08302006.pdf.
138. Georgetown Steel Memo, supra note 133, at 11.
139. Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies:
Market-Oriented Enterprise, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,302 (Dep’t of Comm. May 25, 2007) (request for
comment); Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies:
Market-Oriented Enterprise: Request for Comment, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,649 (Dep’t of Comm. Oct. 25,
2007).
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comparison in antidumping. While one could explain away this contradiction by
pointing to the hybrid nature of China’s economy today, a more plausible
interpretation appears to be that the USDOC’s new policy serves the needs to
maintain maximum levels of protection against Chinese products.
2.

Double Counting

After the USDOC started applying countervailing duty law to imports from
China, Chinese respondents filed legal actions in both U.S. domestic courts and
international venues to challenge the simultaneous imposition of countervailing
and antidumping duties calculated using the surrogate-value methodology. One
central issue raised in these legal actions was whether the amount of
antidumping duties calculated using the surrogate-value methodology already
captures subsidies that may have been conferred on the subject merchandise. If
so, then the subsidies would have been double-counted, once through the
countervailing duties and once through the antidumping duties. As discussed in
detail below, litigation over the double-counting issue forced the USDOC to roll
back some, but not all, of the countervailing duties imposed on Chinese
products.
Initially, Chinese respondents attempted to have U.S. courts strip the
USDOC of its authority to apply countervailing duty law to imports from China
altogether. In GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States (“GPX I”), decided
in September 2009, Chinese respondents argued that the U.S. countervailing
duty statute barred the application of countervailing duty law to imports from
NMEs.140 The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) disagreed. Citing the
ambiguity in both the Federal Circuit’s Georgetown Steel ruling and the
countervailing duty law itself regarding the applicability of the countervailing
duty law to NMEs, the CIT stated that it “cannot say from the statutory language
alone that Commerce does not have the authority to impose [countervailing
duties] on products from an NME-designated country.”141
While Chinese respondents’ argument that the USDOC lacked statutory
authority to apply countervailing duty law to NME imports floundered, their
alternative argument regarding double-counting gained traction in U.S. courts.
In GPX I, the Chinese plaintiff argued that “double counting occurs when
Commerce imposes a CVD remedy to offset an alleged government subsidy, but
then compares a subsidy-free constructed normal value (essentially using
information from surrogate countries) with the original subsidized export price
to calculate the AD margin.”142 Imposing countervailing duties on top of the
antidumping duties, according to the plaintiff, will therefore result in the double
counting and double remedy of the subsidies.143 The CIT in GPX I turned out to
140. 645 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1236-40 (Ct Int’l Trade 2009) (discussing whether the USDOC has
the statutory authority to apply countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs) [hereinafter GPX I].
141. Id. at 1239.
142. Id. at 1241.
143. Id. For detailed illustrations of why double counting might occur in simultaneous
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be highly receptive to this analysis. The CIT stated that under the surrogatevalue method, “the export price is not being compared with the price of the good
in the PRC in which case both sides of the comparison would be equally
affected, but rather, export price, however it is affected by the subsidy, is
compared with the presumptively subsidy-free constructed normal value.”144
Without some type of adjustment, therefore, the simultaneous imposition of
antidumping duties and countervailing duties in this situation “could very well
result in a double remedy.”145 The CIT went on to hold that “if . . . it is too
difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what degree double
counting is occurring, Commerce should refrain from imposing CVDs on NME
goods until it is prepared to address this problem through improved
methodologies or new statutory tools.”146 The CIT remanded the case back to
the USDOC, requiring the USDOC to either forego the imposition of
countervailing duties on the Chinese products at issue or to adopt additional
policies and procedures to address the double-counting issue.147
In its remand determination issued in response to the CIT ruling in GPX I,
the USDOC explored ways to avoid the double remedy of subsidies for Chinese
products.148 The USDOC concluded that it had three options: It could choose
not to apply countervailing duty law to Chinese products, choose to apply the
market economy antidumping methodology to Chinese products, or apply both
countervailing duty law and the NME antidumping methodology to Chinese
products but use the countervailing duties to offset the antidumping duties. 149
The DOC adopted the third option because it believed that it was “the least
objectionable of the three.”150
Upon appeal of the USDOC’s remand determination, in August 2010, the
CIT once again rejected the USDOC’s handling of the double-counting issue. In
GPX International Corp. v. United States (GPX II), the CIT observed that under
the offset proposed by the USDOC, the combined antidumping and
countervailing duties will always equal the unaltered antidumping duties.151
This, according to the CIT, “renders concurrent CVD and AD investigations
unnecessary because the same remedial price adjustment can otherwise be

antidumping and countervailing duty cases involving NME products, see Wentong Zheng, Counting
Once, Counting Twice: The Precarious State of Subsidy Regulation, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 427, 43940 (2013).
144. GPX I, supra note 140, at 1242.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1243.
147. Id. at 1251.
148. Dep’t of Commerce, Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand (2010),
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/remands/09-103.pdf.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. For discussions of why the USDOC found the first two options to be more
objectionable, see id. at 8-9.
151. GPX Int’l Corp. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010)
[hereinafter GPX II].
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obtained by merely conducting an NME AD investigation.”152 The CIT agreed
with the Chinese plaintiffs that “it is not reasonable to ‘force[] foreign parties to
spend many months and large sums of money to go through an investigation, the
end result of which is to calculate a CVD margin, but then to eliminate that
CVD [margin] because it has been offset by some parallel investigation.’”153
The CIT further held that the proposed offset had no legal basis in U.S.
antidumping law anyway.154 Given the USDOC’s inability to determine whether
and to what degree double counting was occurring, the CIT held that the only
option left for the USDOC was not to apply the countervailing duty law to
imports from China.155
In December 2011, in GPX International Corp. v. United States (GPX III),
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s GPX II ruling, but on a different
ground.156 The Federal Circuit was far more skeptical than the CIT about the
entire double-counting argument. It expressed doubts about whether U.S. law
prohibited double-counting, and gave credence to the fact that the USDOC had
determined that it was not clear whether double counting had in fact occurred.157
But the Federal Circuit still held that U.S. countervailing duty law barred the
imposition of countervailing duties on imports from NMEs because of the
principle of legislative ratification. Since Congress amended U.S. trade law
many times after the Georgetown Steel decision, but did not make any changes
that would have altered the USDOC’s handling of countervailing duty law for
NME imports, the Federal Circuit concluded that Congress ratified the
USDOC’s then-prevailing policy of not applying countervailing duty law to
NME imports. 158 If the USDOC believed that countervailing duty law should
apply to NME imports, said the Federal Circuit, then “the appropriate approach
would be to seek legislative change.”159
While the GPX litigation was pending in U.S. courts, the Chinese
government filed claims before the WTO against the USDOC’s simultaneous
application of NME antidumping and countervailing duties to Chinese products.
In October 2010 a WTO dispute settlement panel issued DS379, its final report
152. Id.
153. Id. The CIT did not explain why the respondents could not simply ignore the
countervailing duty proceedings. Arguably, this is because the combined antidumping and
countervailing duty rate will equal the unaltered antidumping rate only if the countervailing duty rate
is less than the unaltered antidumping rate. If the countervailing duty rate is greater than the
unaltered antidumping rate, the combined antidumping and countervailing duty rate will equal the
countervailing duty rate. The respondents could not ignore the countervailing duty proceedings,
because there is a possibility that the combined rate will be determined by the countervailing duty
rate.
154.
Id.
155. Id. at 1346.
156. GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter GPX
III].
157. See id. at 737.
158. Id. at 739-45.
159. Id. at 745.
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in which China pressed its double-counting claims.160 The panel acknowledged
the theoretical possibility of double counting, noting that the use of the NME
antidumping methodology leads to “an asymmetric dumping margin comparison
between an unsubsidized normal value and subsidized export price.”161 This, in
turn, led the panel to believe that “at least some double remedy will likely arise
from the concurrent imposition of countervailing duties and antidumping duties
calculated under an NME methodology.”162 That said, however, the panel went
on to hold that even if double counting did occur, it was not inconsistent with
any of the WTO provisions cited by China and therefore raised no issues under
WTO law.163
Upon appeal of the WTO panel’s ruling in DS379, China found a more
friendly audience for its double-counting claims at the WTO Appellate Body. In
its final report issued in March 2011, the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s
findings as to whether WTO law prohibited double counting.164 Specifically, the
Appellate Body held that the panel erred in its interpretation of Article 19.3 of
the SCM Agreement,165 which requires a countervailing duty to be imposed in
the “appropriate” amounts.166 The Appellate Body stated that “the amount of a
countervailing duty cannot be ‘appropriate’ in situations where that duty
represents the full amount of the subsidy and where antidumping duties,
calculated at least to some extent on the basis of the same subsidization, are
imposed concurrently to remove the same injury to the domestic industry.”167
The Appellate Body then recognized that the occurrence of double counting
depended on “whether and to what extent domestic subsidies have lowered the
export price of a product, and on whether the investigating authority has taken
the necessary corrective steps to adjust its methodology to take account of this
factual situation.”168 In the USDOC proceedings at issue, however, the USDOC
“did not initiate any examination of whether double remedies would arise . . .

160. See Report of the Panel, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter DS379 Panel
Report].
161. Id. ¶ 14.72 (emphasis original).
162. Id. ¶ 14.75 (emphasis original).
163. Id. ¶ 14.76. China argued that double counting was inconsistent with Articles 10, 19.3,
19.4 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Articles VI:3 and I:1 of the GATT 1994. The panel
rejected all of these arguments. See id. at 14.104-.140, .144-.149, .164-.182.
164. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011), ¶¶ 54591 [hereinafter DS379 AB Report].
165. Id. ¶ 582.
166. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, art. 19.3
[hereinafter SCM Agreement] (“When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product,
such countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a nondiscriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized and causing
injury . . . .”).
167. DS379 AB Report, supra note 164, ¶ 582.
168. Id. ¶ 599.
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and refused outright to afford any consideration to the issue or to the
submissions pertaining to the issue that were presented to it.”169 The Appellate
Body found this failure to conduct any factual inquiries as to the doublecounting issue to be inconsistent with the requirement of Article 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement.170
Confronted with two adverse rulings on the application of U.S.
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs, one by the Federal Circuit and
one by the WTO Appellate Body, the United States Congress took up the task of
amending U.S. countervailing duty law by enacting Public Law 112-99 (P.L.
112-99) in March 2012.171 In P.L. 112-99, Congress overrode the Federal
Circuit’s ruling in GPX III and explicitly provided that U.S. countervailing duty
law applied to imports from NMEs.172 To comply with the Appellate Body’s
ruling in DS379, P.L. 112-99 added a new provision to U.S. countervailing duty
law requiring the USDOC to reduce the antidumping duty amount by the
amount of countervailable subsidies that are demonstrated to have been doublecounted.173
In July 2012, pursuant to the new statutory requirements set forth in P.L.
112-99, the USDOC issued its amended determinations for the antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings challenged in DS379.174 In the amended
determinations, the USDOC allocated to the Chinese respondents the burden of
demonstrating their entitlement to adjustments to their antidumping duty
rates.175 The USDOC considered the Chinese respondents to have met this
burden with respect to certain input subsidies, namely, subsidies on inputs used
in the manufacturing of the subject merchandise.176 The USDOC calculated the
amount of the input subsidies that had been double-counted as being sixty-three

169. Id. ¶ 604.
170. Id. ¶ 606.
171. See Act of Mar. 13, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 [hereinafter P.L. 112-99].
172. Id. section 1(a) (“[T]he merchandise on which countervailing duties shall be imposed
under [section 701(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930] includes a class or kind of merchandise imported, or
sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket economy
country.”).
173. Id. section 2(a). The new provision requires the USDOC to adjust the antidumping duty
amount only if the countervailing duty “has been demonstrated to have reduced the average price of
imports of the class or kind of merchandise,” and the USDOC can “reasonably estimate” the extent
to which the countervailing duty has increased the antidumping duty.
174. See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China
(Dep’t of Commerce July 31, 2012) (final section 129 determination) [hereinafter CWP Section 129
Determination],
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/section129/prc-cwcq-steel-pipe-Final-129Determination-20120830.pdf; Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s
Republic of China (Dep’t of Commerce July 31, 2012) (final section 129 determination),
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/section129/prc-otr-tires-Final-129-Determination-20120830.pdf;
Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China (Dep’t of Commerce July 31, 2012)
(final section 129 determination), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/section129/prc-lw-sacks-Final-129Determination-20120830.pdf.
175. See, e.g., CWP Section 129 Determination, supra note 174, at 14.
176. Id. at 14-15.
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percent of the subsidies.177 As a result, the USDOC subtracted sixty-three
percent of the input subsidies from the amount of the antidumping duties.178
In sum, through its legal maneuvers on the double-counting issue, China
succeeded in forcing the United States to scale back some of the countervailing
duties it had newly imposed on Chinese products. In the face of highly complex
economic issues surrounding the double-counting issue,179 the WTO Appellate
Body took a cautious approach and required member countries to at least take
cognizance of the double-counting issue. The WTO’s willingness to reject a
trade practice on the basis of the mere possibility of unfairness manifests its
preference to err on the side of overreaction for the sake of sound principles. But
at the same time, the United States was able to impose at least some
countervailing duties on top of antidumping duties for Chinese products, with
the end result being a higher level of protection against Chinese products.
3.

Public Body

Aside from the threshold questions of whether countervailing duty law
applies to Chinese products and whether they have been double-counted,
countervailing duty investigating authorities from around the world also have to
grapple with questions that are of a technical nature but have a big impact on the
way countervailing duties are assessed for Chinese products. One such technical
question is whether Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks should be
considered “public bodies” and therefore capable of conferring subsidies within
the meaning of the SCM Agreement. As discussed below, the hybrid nature of
the Chinese economy created an opening for importing countries to interpret the
term “public body” in ways that made it easier to prove the existence of a
countervailable subsidy. The WTO, however, rejected some of those
interpretations and required more evidence than mere government ownership in
determining whether a Chinese entity is a public body.
Under the SCM Agreement, only a government or public body is capable
of directly giving subsidies.180 If a private body is accused of giving a subsidy, it
must be demonstrated that a government “entrusts or directs” the private body to
carry out a function that “would normally be vested in the government” and the
practice followed by the private body “in no real sense . . . differs from practices
normally followed by governments.”181
177. Id. at 19. In arriving at this number, the USDOC compared the ratio of change between
input prices as proxied by an aggregate-level China purchasing price index and output prices as
proxied by an aggregate-level China production price index. See id. at 18-19.
178. Id. at 35-36.
179. For discussions of the economics behind the double-counting issue, see Wentong Zheng,
Counting Once, Counting Twice: The Precarious State of Subsidy Regulation, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L.
427, 450-58 (2013).
180. SCM Agreement, supra note 166, art. 1.1(a)(1) (“[A] subsidy shall be deemed to exist
if . . . there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a
Member . . . .”) (emphasis added).
181. Id. .1(a)(1)(iv).
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The interpretation of the term “public body,” which the SCM Agreement
does not define, proved to be a particularly thorny issue in U.S. countervailing
duty proceedings involving Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or stateowned commercial banks (SOCBs). Some of the subsidies alleged in those
proceedings were input subsidies given by Chinese SOEs that sold products to
downstream producers of the subject merchandise at below-market prices and
loan subsidies given by Chinese SOCBs that made loans to producers of the
subject merchandise at below-market interest rates.182 If the SOE input suppliers
and SOCB lenders were considered public bodies, then the USDOC would be
able to bypass the requirement to show “entrustment or direction” for those
entities, making it much easier to prove the existence of a countervailable
subsidy.183
The USDOC moved precisely in this direction by treating Chinese SOEs
and SOCBs as public bodies. In Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from
People’s Republic of China in 2008, for example, the USDOC investigated
certain Chinese steel producers for allegedly providing input subsidies to
downstream steel pipe and tube producers by selling steel products to them for
less than adequate remuneration.184 In determining whether those input suppliers
were public bodies, the USDOC refused to apply a five-factor test that it had
used in prior cases involving non-Chinese producers, on the grounds that the
Chinese government failed to provide sufficient information on factors other
182. See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to
David M. Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and Decision Memorandum
for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road
Tires (OTR Tires) from the People’s Republic of China 9-15 (Jul. 7, 2008),
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-16154-1.pdf [hereinafter OTR Tires CVD I&D
Memo]; Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to David M.
Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s
Republic of China 18-26 (Jun. 16, 2008), http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-142561.pdf [hereinafter LWS CVD I&D Memo]; Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y
for Import Admin., to David M. Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and
Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of
Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China 8-9 (Jun. 13, 2008),
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-14250-1.pdf [hereinafter LWP CVD I&D
Memo]; Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to David M.
Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final
Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Circular-Welded Carbon Quality Steel
Pipe from the People’s Republic of China 9-12, 14-15 (May 29, 2008),
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-12606-1.pdf [hereinafter CWP CVD I&D
Memo].
183. Proving “entrustment or direction” is no easy matter. In US— Countervailing Duty
Investigation on DRAMs, the WTO Appellate Body held that to show “entrustment or direction,”
there must be a “demonstrable link between the government and the conduct of the private body.”
Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R (Jun. 27, 2005),
¶ 112. It further held that “mere policy pronouncements” are insufficient, and that “entrustment and
direction” imply “a more active role than mere acts of encouragement” and cannot be “inadvertent or
a mere by-product of government regulation.” Id. ¶ 114.
184. See LWP CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 8-9.
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than the government ownership of the input suppliers185 Instead, for those input
suppliers, the USDOC adopted a “majority ownership” rule, under which any
input suppliers that were majority owned by the Chinese government were
considered public bodies186 In another case, Coated Free Sheet Paper from the
People’s Republic of China in 2007, the USDOC similarly treated Chinese
SOCBs as public bodies on the grounds that the Chinese government maintained
near complete state ownership of the banking sector in China and exercised
extensive control and influences over the operations of SOCBs.187
China challenged the USDOC’s public body determinations before the
WTO. In DS379, the WTO dispute settlement panel sided with the USDOC with
respect to its determinations for both the SOEs and the SOCBs. As for the SOEs,
the panel interpreted the term “public body” in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM
Agreement as “any entity controlled by a government.188 Government
ownership, according to the Panel, was “highly relevant (indeed potentially
dispositive) evidence of government control.”189 The panel therefore found “no
legal error . . . in giving primacy to evidence of majority governmentownership.”190 For the same reasons, the panel also upheld the USDOC’s
determination that the Chinese SOCBs in question were public bodies.191
On appeal of the panel’s report in DS379, the WTO Appellate Body
reversed the panel’s finding as to the SOEs but upheld its finding as to the
SOCBs. The Appellate Body first disagreed with the panel’s equation of public
body with government control, stating that “control of an entity by a
government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public
body.”192 The Appellate Body went on to hold that the assessment of whether an
entity is a public body “must focus on evidence relevant to the question of
whether the entity is vested with or exercises government authority.”193
According to the Appellate Body, the USDOC’s reliance on government
ownership in its public body determinations was not sufficient “because
evidence of government ownership, in itself, is not evidence of meaningful
control of an entity by government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis
185. Id. at 28-30. The five-factor test the USDOC used in prior cases inquires about the
government ownership of an entity, the government’s presence on the entity’s board of directors, the
government’s control over the entity’s activities, the entity’s pursuit of governmental policies or
interests, and whether the entity is created by statute. Id. at 26-27.
186. Id. at 29.
187. See Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to David
M. Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., on the Issues and Decision Memorandum
for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper
from
the
People’s
Republic
of
China
55-61
(Oct.
17,
2007),
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf [hereinafter CFP CVD I&D Memo].
188. DS379 Panel Report, supra note 160, ¶ 8.94.
189. Id. ¶ 8.134.
190. Id. ¶ 8.136.
191. Id. ¶¶ 8.142-.143.
192. DS379 AB Report, supra note 164, ¶ 320.
193. Id. ¶ 345.
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for establishing that the entity is vested with authority to perform a
governmental function.”194 As for the SOCBs, the Appellate Body noted that the
USDOC considered “extensive evidence relating to the relationship between the
SOCBs and the Chinese Government, including evidence that the SOCBs are
meaningfully controlled by the government in the exercise of their functions.”195
The Appellate Body concluded that “these considerations, taken together,
demonstrate that the USDOC’s public body determination in respect of SOCBs
was supported by evidence on the record that these SOCBs exercise
governmental functions on behalf of the Chinese Government.”196
In a subsequent WTO dispute settlement proceeding, DS437, a WTO
dispute settlement panel further clarified the meaning of “public body” in
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.197 The panel in DS437 understood the
Appellate Body in DS379 “to have found that the critical consideration in
identifying a public body is the question of authority to perform governmental
functions.”198 The panel was not persuaded, however, by China’s argument that
“[a] public body, like government in the narrow sense, thus must itself possess
the authority to ‘regulate, control, supervise or restrain’ the conduct of others.”
199 That interpretation, according to the panel, would equate the term “public
body” with the term “government agency,” an approach that the Appellate Body
in DS379 did not follow.200 But at the same time, the panel also rejected a
definition of the term “public body” based on “simple ownership or control by a
government.”201 The panel thus concluded that the USDOC acted inconsistently
with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement when it found that Chinese SOEs
were public bodies “based solely on the grounds that these enterprises were
(majority) owned, or otherwise controlled, by the Government of China.”202
In sum, through its interpretations of the term “public body,” the WTO
stayed away from automatically treating all Chinese SOEs as part of the Chinese
government itself. The WTO took a more nuanced approach that requires
inquiries into whether the SOEs exercise governmental functions. While this
approach poses hurdles to finding a countervailable subsidy from the business
operations of Chinese SOEs, it preserves WTO member countries’ ability to

194. Id. ¶ 346.
195. Id. ¶ 355.
196. Id.
197. See Report of the Panel, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
Products from China, ¶ 7.65-.75, WT/DS437/R (July 14, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 Panel Report].
198. Id. ¶ 7.66.
199. Id. ¶ 7.67.
200. Id. ¶ 7.68.
201. Id. ¶ 7.68-.72.
202. DS437 Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.75.The panel, however, did not address the
United States’ argument that the term “public body” should be interpreted to mean “an entity that is
controlled by a government such that the government can use the resources of that entity as its own.”
See Id. ¶ 7.74. The panel considered it unnecessary to evaluate that argument because it was not the
basis of the USDOC’s public body determinations in the underlying proceedings. Id.
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impose countervailing duties if the Chinese SOEs are indeed engaged in
activities of governmental nature.
4.

Out-of-Country Benchmarks

Another issue that has had a tremendous impact on the assessment of
countervailing duties for Chinese products is the use of out-of-country or crossborder benchmarks in measuring the magnitudes of subsidies. As discussed
below, the extensive role of the Chinese government in China’s economy
created an opportunity for investigating authorities to discard Chinese domestic
prices and opt for third-country prices as the benchmark in calculating the
amounts of countervailing duties. Like the use of surrogate values in
antidumping, the use of out-of-country benchmarks in countervailing duty
proceedings tends to inflate the amounts of countervailing duties and result in a
higher level of protection against Chinese products. But as detailed below,
China was able to persuade the WTO to reject the use of out-of-country
benchmarks in some of the most egregious situations, dealing a setback to
investigating authorities and petitioners seeking to take advantage of the WTO’s
tolerance of such benchmarks.
Under the SCM Agreement, a countervailable subsidy exists only if the
alleged subsidy confers a “benefit” on the recipient of the subsidy.203 The SCM
Agreement, however, does not offer a definition of the term “benefit.” It only
provides guidelines on how to calculate the benefit of a subsidy to the recipient
in four scenarios involving the government provision of equity capital, loans,
and loan guarantees, and the provision of goods or services or the purchase of
goods by a government.204 In Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, the WTO Appellate Body made clear that the common theme
of those guidelines is to identify a subsidy by determining “whether the recipient
has received a ‘financial contribution’ on terms more favourable than those
available to the recipient in the market.”205 In United States-Final
Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, the Appellate Body held that under Article 14(d) of the SCM
Agreement, which concerns the government provision of goods or services for
less than adequate remuneration, an investigating authority “may use a
benchmark other than private prices in the country of provision . . . if it is first
established that private prices in that country are distorted because of the
government’s predominant role in providing those goods.”206 This opened the

203. SCM Agreement, supra note 166, art. 1.1(b).
204. Id. art. 14.
205. Report of the Appellate Body, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, ¶ 157, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
206. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination
With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 90, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004).

Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

144

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:2

door to the use of out-of-country prices as the benchmark for measuring the
benefit of a subsidy.207
After the USDOC started applying countervailing duties to Chinese
products in 2007, the USDOC moved swiftly to use out-of-country benchmarks
to measure the magnitudes of several types of alleged Chinese subsidies: loan,
input, and land use subsidies. In Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s
Republic of China in 2007, the USDOC investigated whether the Chinese
producers of the subject merchandise received loans from Chinese policy banks
and state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) at below-market interest rates.208
In evaluating whether the loans were at below-market rates and, if so, by how
much, the USDOC refused to use the interest rates for loans made by private and
foreign banks in China as the benchmark for market interest rates. This was
because “[the Chinese government]’s intervention in the banking sector creates
significant distortions, even restricting and influencing private and foreign banks
within the PRC.”209 The USDOC also rejected Chinese national interest rates as
the benchmark by pointing to the “pervasiveness of the [Chinese government]’s
intervention in the banking sector.”210 Having rejected these in-country
benchmarks, the USDOC constructed an out-of-country loan benchmark based
on the interest rates of thirty-three lower- to middle-income countries considered
comparable to China’s economic development level.211 After Coated Free
Paper from the People’s Republic of China, the USDOC routinely used the
same kind of out-of-country loan benchmarks in subsequent countervailing duty
proceedings involving Chinese products.212
The USDOC also used out-of-country benchmarks to measure whether
Chinese SOEs sold inputs to downstream producers at below-market prices. In
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of
China, for example, the USDOC found that 96.1% of the input in question, hotrolled steel, was provided by SOEs.213 The USDOC thus rejected Chinese
domestic prices for hot-rolled steel as the market price benchmark because
“where the Department finds that the government provides the majority, or a

207. For detailed discussions of the history of out-of-country benchmarks in countervailing
duty law, see Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of
Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8-35 (2010).
208. See Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing
Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China (Oct. 17, 2007),
at 5, http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf [hereinafter China CFS Paper
I&D Memo].
209. Id. at 5.
210. Id. at 6.
211. Id. In constructing the out-of-country loan benchmark, the USDOC did not use the simple
average of the interest rates of the comparable countries, but regressed the interest rates of the
comparable countries on a World Bank governance index measuring the quality of each country’s
institutions. See id.
212. See, e.g., CWP CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 6-7; LWS CVD I&D Memo, supra
note 182, at 82-83; OTR Tires CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 7-9.
213. CWP CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 11.
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substantial portion of the market for a good or service, prices for such goods and
services in the country will be considered significantly distorted and will not be
an appropriate basis of comparison for determining whether there is a
benefit.”214 The USDOC then used the import prices the Chinese respondents
paid to suppliers from outside of China or, when such import prices were not
applicable, world market export prices, to determine if the Chinese SOEs
provided a benefit to the downstream producers of the subject merchandise.215
The USDOC also applied the same out-of-country benchmark analysis to
Chinese land use subsidies. In Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s
Republic of China, the USDOC probed whether the Chinese government granted
land-use rights to Chinese producers of the subject merchandise at below-market
prices.216 The USDOC rejected Chinese land prices as the market price
benchmark because “Chinese land prices are distorted by the significant
government role in the market.”217 The USDOC then compared the prices for
land use rights in China with certain land prices in Thailand, prices that the
USDOC argued were “comparable market prices for land purchases in a country
at a comparable level of economic development that is reasonably proximate to,
but outside of, China.”218
China challenged the USDOC’s use of out-of-country benchmarks for
alleged Chinese input, loan, and land use subsidies before the WTO in two
dispute settlement proceedings, DS379 and DS437. In DS379, China failed to
persuade the panel and the Appellate Body that the USDOC acted inconsistently
with WTO law in using such out-of-country benchmarks. As for input subsidies,
the Appellate Body in DS379 interpreted its report in Softwood Lumber as
“exclud[ing] the application of a per se rule, according to which an investigating
authority could properly conclude in every case, and regardless of any other
evidence, that the fact that the government is the predominant supplier means
that private prices are distorted for the use of out-of-country benchmarks.”219
The Appellate Body acknowledged that the USDOC’s consideration of factors
other than government market share in the underlying proceedings “appears to
have been somewhat cursory.”220 But since the Chinese government had a
predominant 96.1% market share in the market in question, the Appellate Body
considered the USDOC’s rejection of in-country benchmarks to be justified
because “evidence of factors other than government market share will have less
weight in the determination of price distortion than in a situation where the
government has only a ‘significant’ presence in the market.”221 As for loan

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 66.
See LWS CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
DS379 AB Report, supra note 164, ¶ 443.
Id. ¶ 454.
Id. ¶ 455.
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subsidies, the Appellate Body held that its reasoning in Softwood Lumber
concerning the use of out-of-country benchmarks was “equally applicable” in
measuring the benefits of loan subsidies.222 On this basis, the Appellate Body
concluded that the USDOC’s decision not to rely on interest rates in China for
Chinese loans was “reasoned and adequate.”223 The Appellate Body found,
however, that the panel below failed to make an objective assessment of whether
the out-of-country benchmark constructed by the USDOC for Chinese loans was
consistent with the requirement of Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement.224 As
for land use subsidies, an issue not appealed by China to the Appellate Body, the
panel in DS379 determined that the USDOC underwent sufficient analysis in
rejecting Chinese land-use prices as the subsidy benchmark.225 The panel further
upheld the out-of-country benchmarks the USDOC constructed from Thailand
prices, noting that although those out-of-country benchmarks were not a perfect
representation of what land use prices would be in China in the absence of
government distortions, it was not clear that adjusting the benchmarks in ways
suggested by China “would ensure a closer approximation of the counterfactual
situation.”226
In DS437, China pressed again on the use of out-of-country benchmarks for
Chinese input subsidies, this time with success. The Appellate Body in DS437
found that the panel below “failed to conduct a case-by-case analysis of whether
the USDOC had properly examined whether the relevant in-country prices were
market determined or were distorted by governmental intervention.”227 Instead,
the panel “simply assumed that because the Appellate Body had faced a similar
situation in [DS379], China had failed to establish that the USDOC acted
inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 14(d).”228
After reversing the panel, the Appellate Body went on to complete the legal
analysis and concluded that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 14(d)
of the SCM Agreement by rejecting in-country prices in China as the subsidy
benchmark.229 According to the Appellate Body, the USDOC based its rejection
of in-country prices in China on the fact that government-related entities were
the predominant suppliers of the relevant goods.230 The USDOC did not explain
whether and how the government-related suppliers “possessed and exerted

222. Id. ¶ 489.
223. Id. ¶ 509.
224. Id. ¶ 527. But because of the lack of factual records before it, the Appellate Body was
unable to make a judgment of its own on whether the USDOC’s out-of-country loan benchmark was
sufficient. See id. ¶¶ 528-37.
225.
DS379 Panel Report, supra note 160, ¶ 10.81.
226. Id. ¶ 10.189.
227. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
Products from China, ¶ 4.79, WT/DS437/AB/R (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 AB Report].
228. Id.
229. Id. ¶¶ 4.95-.96.
230. Id. ¶ 4.95.
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market power such that other in-country prices were distorted.”231 “Nor did the
USDOC explain whether the prices of the [government-related suppliers]
themselves were market determined.”232
In sum, in a pattern that has become all too familiar, trade law has worked
its way into a delicate balance regarding the use of out-of-country benchmarks
for Chinese subsidies: It accepted such benchmarks when there was evidence of
extensive market distortion by the Chinese government, but refused to infer
market distortion simply from the Chinese government’s predominant presence
in the market through SOEs. Investigating authorities would still be able to
discard prices charged by Chinese SOEs as being distorted, but that would
require a more rigorous market distortion analysis than simply pointing to the
government ownership and control of those SOEs. This will pose a hurdle to
efforts to use countervailing duty law as a protectionist tool against Chinese
products.
C. Safeguards
Aside from antidumping and countervailing duties, trade law also
authorizes the imposition of so-called safeguard measures—measures that
temporarily suspend a WTO member country’s tariff concessions or other WTO
obligations in order to remedy serious injury to domestic industries caused by
surges of imports from other WTO member countries.233 However, this type of
safeguard, referred to as the general safeguard below, was considered inadequate
to deal with surges of imports from China. Upon China’s entry into the WTO,
WTO member countries negotiated with China a special, temporary type of
safeguard that allows them to specifically target imports from China under
lowered evidentiary standards.234 As will be discussed below, this “China
safeguard” deviates from the WTO’s fundamental non-discrimination principle
and is designed to channel protectionist pressures resulting from China’s WTO
entry.
Unlike antidumping and countervailing duties, which do not facially single
out China, the China safeguard is by design a trade remedy instrument with
explicit, lopsided biases against Chinese products. First, the China safeguard
allows WTO member countries to suspend their WTO obligations only towards
China, in sharp contrast to the non-discrimination requirement under the general
safeguard.235 Second, the China safeguard can be invoked under a lower injury

231. Id. ¶ 4.96.
232. Id.
233. See GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. XIX:1(a); WTO Agreement on Safeguards, June 1,
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154, art. 2.1 [hereinafter WTO Agreement on Safeguards].
234. China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.
235. Article 2.2 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards requires that a general safeguard be
applied to imports regardless of source. See Agreement on Safeguards, arts. 2(2), in Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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standard than the general safeguard. Under the China Accession Protocol, WTO
member countries can resort to the China safeguard when Chinese products are
imported “in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly
competitive products.”236 The term “market disruption” is further defined to
refer to the situation where imports “are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or
relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material
injury to the domestic industry.”237 This injury standard is generally understood
to be easier to meet than the “serious injury” standard under the general
safeguard.238 Third, it is harder for China to seek trade compensations from
countries that impose the China safeguard than for other countries to seek trade
compensations from countries that impose the general safeguard. Under the
general safeguard, a country whose products are subject to the safeguard is
allowed to suspend substantially equivalent concessions to the trade of the
country that imposes the safeguard,239 subject to a three-year delay if the
safeguard is based on an absolute increase in imports.240 By contrast, under the
China safeguard, China is entitled to no trade compensations for the first two
years of a China safeguard even if the safeguard is based on a relative increase
in imports.241 Finally, the general safeguard may not be applied for more than

236. China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.1.
237. Id. art. 16.4.
238. The “serious injury” standard under the general safeguard is defined in the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards as “a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic
industry.” WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 4.1(a). The WTO Appellate Body
has found that this standard is “exacting” and “very high” compared to the “material injury” standard
contained in the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement, and Article VI of the GATT.
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or
Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, ¶ 124, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R
(May 1, 2001). By contrast, the “market disruption” standard under the China safeguard is
understood to be a lower standard. A White House summary of the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO
Agreement, the blueprint for the China Accession Protocol, stated that under the China safeguard,
the United States would be able to apply restraints unilaterally based on standards that are lower than
those in the WTO Safeguards Agreement.” Summary of the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement,
Prepared by the White House National Economic Council, November 15, 1999, 16 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1888, 1890 (1999). In a congressional testimony, then U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky stated that the China safeguard “permits us to act based on lower showing of injury.”
Accession of China to the WTO; Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th
Cong. 49 (2000) (Statement of Hon. Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative). For
more discussions of the injury standard under the general safeguard and the China safeguard, see
Jeanne J. Grimmett, Chinese Tire Imports: Section 421 Safeguards and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), CONG. RES. SERV. (Jul. 12, 2011), at 7-9; Jing Ma, Product-Specific Safeguard
in China’s WTO Accession Agreement: An Analysis of Its Terms and Its Initial Application in
Section 421 Investigations, 22 BU INT’L L.J. 189, 195-197 (2004).
239. See WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 8.2.
240. Id. art. 8.3.
241. China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.6 (“If a measure is taken as a result of a
relative increase in the level of imports, China has the right to suspend the application of
substantially equivalent concessions or obligations under the GATT 1994 to the trade of the WTO
Member applying the measure, if such measure remains in effect more than two years.”).
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four years initially and eight years in total.242 By contrast, the only requirement
for the duration of the China safeguard is that the China safeguard is to be
imposed “only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy
the market disruption.”243
With these institutional biases against China on the China safeguard, the
WTO Appellate Body has restrained itself from disturbing the outcome of
China’s WTO entry negotiations. In one WTO dispute settlement proceeding,
DS399, China challenged a safeguard measure applied by the United States to
imports of certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China.244 The
Appellate Body in DS399 took a very flexible approach to the interpretation of
the phrase “increasing rapidly” in Paragraph 16.4 of the China Accession
Protocol, granting investigating authorities sufficient leeway in determining
whether the requisite “market disruption” exists for the invocation of the China
safeguard.245 The Appellate Body then evaluated to what extent the injury to the
importing country’s domestic industry must be caused by rapidly increasing
imports from China before the China safeguard could be triggered.246
Paragraph 16.4 of the China Accession Protocol provides that for there to
be market disruption, imports from China must be increasing rapidly so as to be
“a significant cause” of material injury, or threat of material injury, to the
importing country’s domestic industry.247 The Appellate Body interpreted that
language to mean that rapidly increasing imports from China “may be one of
several causes that contribute to producing or bringing about material injury to
the domestic industry.”248 The Appellate Body added that while “the
contribution made by rapidly increasing imports to the material injury of the

242. WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 7.1, 7.3.
243. China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.6. Note, however, that China is entitled to
suspend substantially equivalent concessions to the trade of the country imposing the China
safeguard if the safeguard is still in effect after two years where the safeguard was based on a
relative increase in imports, or after three years where the safeguard was based on an absolute
increase in imports. See id.
244. See Request for Consultation by China, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/1 (Sept. 16, 2009), at 1.
245. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Certain
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, ¶¶ 126-170, WT/DS399/AB/R (Sept. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter DS399 AB Report]. Specifically, the Appellate Body held that the “increasing rapidly”
phrase did not require an investigating authority to “focus on the movements in imports during the
most recent past, or during the period immediately preceding the authority’s decision.” Id. ¶ 149.
The Appellate Body also found that the ordinary meaning of the term “rapidly” did not suggest “an
exclusive focus on the rates of increase in subject imports.” Id. ¶ 158. Particularly, the Appellate
Body held that a decline in the yearly rate of increase did not necessarily preclude a finding that
imports are increasing rapidly. Id. ¶ 162. Finally, the Appellate Body held that the phrase
“increasingly rapidly” did not require an investigating authority to assess the most recent rate of
increase in subject imports relative to the rates of increase in earlier periods. Id. ¶ 167.
246. Id. ¶¶ 171-338.
247. China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.4.
248. DS399 AB Report, supra note 245, ¶ 177.
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domestic industry must be important or notable,”249 the inclusion of the term
“significant” to qualify “a cause” does not impose “a more rigorous causation
standard than other WTO agreements, which require that imports ‘cause’
injury.”250 In so holding, the Appellate Body essentially read the word
“significant” out of the injury standard for the China safeguard. Furthermore, in
what appeared to be an insinuation that China itself negotiated a lower injury
standard for the China safeguard as part of its WTO entry deal, the Appellate
Body stated that the object and purpose of the China Accession Protocol “seems
to weigh in favour of an interpretation pursuant to which temporary relief is
available whenever rapidly increasing imports are making an ‘important’, rather
than a ‘particularly strong [and] substantial’, contribution to the material injury
of the domestic industry.”251 Based on this low injury standard, the Appellate
Body finally held that the United States International Trade Commission did not
err in concluding that rapidly increasing imports from China were a significant
cause of material injury to the domestic industry within the meaning of
Paragraph 16.4 of the China Accession Protocol.252
The China safeguard epitomizes the perpetual dilemma facing trade law:
On one hand, trade law needs to adhere to principles to maintain a rule-based
trade system, but on the other hand, trade law needs sufficient flexibility to
accommodate and contain disruptive forces like China. The China safeguard
solves this dilemma by compromising on principles, but only for a limited
period of time. Pursuant to Paragraph 16.9 of the China Accession Protocol, the
duration of the China safeguard is limited to twelve years from China’s WTO
entry.253 The China safeguard, therefore, expired on December 11, 2013. With
this temporary deviation from principles, trade law afforded the world trade
community greater abilities to withstand the impact from liberalizing trade with
China.
D. Managed Trade
One important feature of trade law’s responses to China’s rise in world
trade is its tolerance of the frequent uses of managed trade measures – namely,
restrictive trade measures imposed through voluntary agreements, for Chinese
products. As will be discussed below, one guiding principle of trade law is to
discourage the use of managed trade measures, but when it comes to China,
managed trade has played an important role in easing the tensions stemming
from China’s participation in the world trade order.
Managed trade was once a mainstay in world trade. Between 1974 and
2005, world trade in textiles and apparel products was governed by an exquisite
249. Id.
250. Id. ¶ 181. The Appellate Body believed that the term “cause” in other WTO agreements
also required a “genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect.” Id.
251. Id. ¶ 184.
252. Id. ¶ 338.
253. China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.9.
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managed-trade system established under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
(MFA),254 which allowed “a complex system of unilateral and bilateral quotas,
on a product-by-product and country-by-country basis.”255 In the 1970s and
1980s, GATT member countries frequently resorted to the so-called voluntary
export restraints (VERs), that is, negotiated export arrangements outside the
rubric of GATT rights and obligations, as a way of resolving trade disputes.256
VERs gained increasing popularity with countries seeking to protect their
domestic industries257 and became “arguably the most pernicious form of
protection in the 1970s and 1980s.” 258
Managed-trade measures like VERs have been widely criticized as
operating in a gray area outside of the GATT framework and undermining the
integrity of the multilateral trade system.259 The adverse economic impact of
managed trade has also been well-documented.260 But nonetheless, managed
trade became a popular trade policy tool because it was a politically attractive
form of protection.261 In particular, all of the parties involved in a managedtrade regime, including the importing country, the exporting country, and third
countries, lack sufficient incentives to object to its use.262

254. See Multi-Fiber Arrangement, Formerly the Arrangement Regarding International Trade
in Textiles, 25 UST 1001, TIAS No 7840 (Dec 20, 1973).
255. Alice J.-H. Wohn, Towards GATT Integration: Circumventing Quantitative Restrictions
on Textiles and Apparel Trade under the Multi Fiber Arrangement, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 375,
395 (2001).
256. Many of such VERs were targeted at Japan, whose surging exports at the time were
flooding the world market. In the 1970s and the 1980s, a number of Japanese products, including
color television sets, motor vehicles, video tape recorders, motor cycles, machine tools, quartz
watches, and fork-lift trucks were made subject to voluntary export arrangements negotiated
between the United States, Europe, and Canada on one hand and Japan on the other hand. See Philip
Turner & Jean-Pierre Tuveri, Some Effects of Export Restraints on Japanese Trading Behavior,
OECD ECON. STUD., Spring 1984, 93, 94-95.
257. As of 1991, only twenty four safeguard measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of the
GATT were in force, while two hundred and eighty four gray-area measures such as VERs were
known to exist. Terence P. Stewart et al., Opportunities in the WTO for Increased Liberalization of
Goods: Making Sure the Rules Work for All and That Special Needs Are Addressed, 24 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 652, 657 (2000).
258. Jeffrey J. Schott, Safeguards, in THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 113, 114
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ed., 1994).
259. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 47 (1988); ALAN O. SYKES, THE WTO
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY 24-25 (2006).
260. See, e.g., Jaime de Melo & L. Alan Winters, Do Exporters Gain from VERs?, 37 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1331 (1993) (arguing that VERs cause efficiency losses to importing countries by
inducing inputs to shift from their most efficient industries to protected industries); Phedon
Nicolaides, Safeguards and the Problem of VERs, INTERECONOMICS, January/February 1990, 18,
21-22 (arguing that VERs encourage collusion among producers in the exporting country).
261. Nicolaides, supra note 260, at 20.
262. Id. The affected exporting country tolerates managed trade because it would enable the
exporting country to charge higher prices. The importing country prefers managed trade because
unlike tariffs, quantitative restrictions under managed trade prevent foreign producers from
increasing their market share as their efficiency improves. Third countries rarely object to managed
trade because it handicaps their most efficient competitors. Id.
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In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT sought a collective solution
to the managed trade problem and undertook an ambitious task of reining in the
use of managed-trade measures like the VERs. As a result of the Uruguay
Round, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was signed as one of the
basic legal texts of the newly established WTO.263 The ATC terminated the
managed trade system for the textiles and clothing sector with a ten-year phaseout period.264 During the phase-out period, quotas for textiles and clothing
products were progressively reduced until they were completely eliminated on
January 1, 2005.265 As for VERs, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides
that WTO member countries “shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary
export restraints, orderly marketing agreements or other similar measures on the
export or the import side.”266 The prohibited actions include “actions taken by a
single Member as well as actions under agreements, arrangements and
understandings entered into by two or more Members.”267
China’s WTO entry in 2001, however, posed a problem for the WTO’s
efforts to scale back managed trade. The sheer size of China’s economy
demanded flexibility in dealing with China’s potential impact on world trade,
and, aside from creative applications of antidumping and countervailing duty
laws, trade law resorted to managed trade as a way of providing that flexibility.
Trade law’s turn to managed trade can be seen in the way it accommodated
China in the textiles and clothing sector. China joined the WTO in 2001, three
years before the quota system established under the MFA was scheduled to be
dismantled.268 To protect importing countries from the short-term shock that
China would be causing to the textiles and clothing markets in a quota-less
world,269 the WTO created a special safeguard mechanism just for textiles and
clothing products from China for the first three years after the expiration of the
ATC. Paragraph 242 of the Working Party Report on China’s Accession allows
263. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods—Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 28, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/16-tex.pdf.
264. Id. art. 9 (“This Agreement and all restrictions thereunder shall stand terminated on the
first day of the 121st month that the WTO Agreement is in effect, on which date the textiles and
clothing sector shall be fully integrated into GATT 1994. There shall be no extension of this
Agreement.”).
265. Id. art. 2.6-2.7.
266. WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 11.1(b). In a footnote, Article
11.1(b) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides that “examples of similar measures include
export moderation, export-price or import-price monitoring systems, export or import surveillance,
compulsory import cartels and discretionary export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford
protection.” Id. art. 11.1(b) n.4.
267. Id. art. 11.1(b).
268. As noted above, the ATC was scheduled to terminate on January 1, 2005. See supra note
264 and accompanying text.
269. Between 2001 and 2004, China’s exports of textiles and clothing products to the United
States more than doubled, increasing from about $7 billion to about $15 billion. UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: TEXTILE SAFEGUARD PROCEDURES
SHOULD BE IMPROVED (April 2005), at 1.
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WTO member countries to place limits on imports of textiles and clothing
products from China through the end of 2008 if such imports “were, due to
market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly development of trade in
these products.”270
Both the European Union and the United States took advantage of the
special China textiles safeguard. In April 2005, the European Commission
launched safeguard investigations into the sharp surge in imports of Chinese
textiles and clothing products to the European Union.271 On June 10, 2005, the
European Union and China reached an agreement to terminate the pending
safeguard investigations and to manage the growth of Chinese imports to the
EU.272 In a quintessential managed-trade deal, the EU and China agreed to limit
growth in ten categories of Chinese imports to between 8 percent and 12.5
percent per year for 2005, 2006, and 2007.273 In the United States, twice in 2003
and again in 2004, U.S. producers petitioned the U.S. government for safeguard
quotas on imports of textiles and clothing products from China.274 The U.S.
government granted all three petitions and imposed quotas on ten categories of
textiles and clothing products imported from China.275 On November 6, 2005,
the United States and China signed a memorandum of understanding that
replaced those quotas and additional pending safeguard investigations with a
managed-trade system covering most categories of textiles and clothing products
for 2006, 2007, and 2008.276 The U.S.-China MOU capped the rate of increase
of imports of textiles products from China to the U.S. to 12.5 percent in 2006
and 2007, and 15 percent in 2008.277 For imports of clothing products from
China to the U.S., the maximum rate of increase was 10 percent in 2006, 12.5
percent in 2007, and 15 percent in 2008.278
Aside from authorizing managed trade for Chinese textiles and clothing
products, trade law has also tolerated the use of managed trade for Chinese
products for which it has not been explicitly authorized. In July 2013, the
European Commission reached a price undertaking agreement with Chinese
solar panel exporters to settle pending antidumping investigations into Chinese

270. Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN01(3) (Nov. 10, 2001),
¶ 242.
271. Press Release, European Commission launches investigations into sharp surge in Chinese
textiles imports, IP/05/473 (Apr. 24, 2005), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-473_en.htm.
272. See Press Release, EU-China textiles agreement 10 June 2005, MEMO/05/201 (Jun. 12,
2005), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-201_en.htm?locale=en.
273. Id.
274. Michael F. Martin, U.S. Clothing and Textile Trade With China and the World: Trends
Since the End of Quotas, CRS Report for Congress (Jul. 10, 2007), at 23.
275. Id.
276. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China Concerning Trade in Textile and Apparel Products
(Nov. 6, 2005), http://otexa.trade.gov/PDFs/US-China_Textile_MOU.pdf.
277. Martin, supra note 274, at 24.
278. Id.
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solar panel products sold in the European Union.279 The price undertaking
agreement replaced provisional antidumping duties imposed on imports of
Chinese solar panel products to the EU with a minimum price commitment that
capped the price of the Chinese imports at fifty-six euro cents per watt.280 The
agreement did not exempt Chinese solar panel imports from antidumping duties
when such imports exceeded seven gigawatts, roughly half of the EU’s demand
for solar panels.281 The price undertaking agreement, therefore, functioned as a
tacit permission for Chinese producers to supply half of the EU’s solar panel
market. Although this attempt at managing solar panel trade between the EU and
China does not technically violate WTO rules,282 it goes against the spirit of the
WTO’s prohibition of VERs in every practical sense.283
In sum, despite trade law’s earlier efforts to limit the use of managed trade,
it had to turn to the device as a way of mitigating the impact of China on the
world trade order. Again, between principles and protectionism, trade law had to
favor the latter, albeit temporarily and tacitly, to accommodate the disruptive
forces that China would have otherwise unleashed onto the world trade system.
III.
TRADE LAW’S REBALANCING: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
The foregoing discussions tell a story of how China disrputed trade law’s
balance. As trade law deviates from its previous principles-versus-protectionism
equilibrium, a crucial question to ask is whether trade law will be able to
stabilize in a new equilibrium where China’s role in world trade is taken into
account.
Unfortunately, this question cannot be fully answered before China’s role
itself is stabilized. Will China continue on the path of expansion it has been on

279. European Commission Press Release, Commissioner De Gucht: “We found an amicable
solution in the EU-China solar panels case that will lead to a new market equilibrium at sustainable
prices” (Jul. 27, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-729_en.htm.
280. Robin Emmott & Ben Blanchard, EU, China resolve solar dispute - their biggest trade
row by far, REUTERS (Jul. 27, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/27/us-eu-china-solaridUSBRE96Q03Z20130727.
281. Id.
282. The WTO Antidumping Agreement allows WTO member countries to suspend or
terminate antidumping proceedings “upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any
exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that the
authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated.” WTO Antidumping
Agreement, supra note 33, art. 8.1.
283. Michael Moore demonstrates that in a perfectly-competitive small-country model, a
maximum level of imports under a VER and a minimum import price undertaking can result in
identically higher prices, lower imports, increased domestic profits, and higher domestic production
compared to free trade. See Michael O. Moore, VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO, 13
REV. INT’L ECON. 298, 298 (2005). Moore further demonstrates that in the context of a domestic
monopoly facing foreign competition, a minimum price undertaking can result in even lower
consumer welfare than under a quantity-based VER. Id. at 298-99.
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in the last three decades?284 Or will China plateau and be integrated into a steady
world trade system?285 Or will China’s export growth collapse and force the
legal structures that trade law put in place in response to China’s rise to
unravel?286 Without knowing which development trajectory China will follow, it
is premature to predict whether or when trade law’s rebalancing act on China
will be complete.
That said, a preliminary assessment of trade law’s responses to China’s rise
so far could yield valuable policy implications. This assessment has to be done
in light of the ultimate goals trade law is supposed to serve. Given the two
competing considerations of trade law—free trade principles and
protectionism—an objective evaluation of whether trade law has by far
successfully handled challenges posed by China requires the assessor to
approach the task from a holistic point of view, taking into account both
considerations. Under this holistic approach, the criterion for judging the success
or failure of trade law’s rebalancing in response to China has to be whether trade
law was able to offer protection from China’s impact without deviating too
much from its core principles.
Based on the analyses in the previous section, this Article’s answer to the
question of whether trade law has by far succeeded in accommodating China is a
cautious “yes.” On one hand, trade law’s record on China is not perfect: on
many occasions it has shifted, blatantly or subtly, to a less principle-oriented
approach in contravention of the fundamental principles cherished by trade law
elsewhere. Trade law sanctioned the use of surrogate values in antidumping
proceedings in a manner that gives importing countries wide discretion to inflate
antidumping margins for Chinese products. Trade law considered China’s
economy to be market-based enough to apply countervailing duty law, but not
market-based enough to warrant market-economy treatment in antidumping
proceedings. Trade law also fashioned a discriminatory China-specific safeguard
and tolerated the use of managed trade that it had vowed to eliminate in other
settings for Chinese products.287 All of these represent a shift towards
protectionism at the expense of sound, consistent principles.
But on the other hand, trade law has corrected itself on some of the most
egregious protectionist policies on China. Trade law rejected the presumption of
284. Proponents of this scenario predict that China’s economy will soon surpass that of the
United States to become the world’s largest. See Chinese and American GDP Forecasts: Catching
the
Eagle,
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
22,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/08/chinese-and-american-gdp-forecasts.
285. Official economic data coming out of China suggests that China’s GDP growth has
slowed in recent years but is not showing further signs of deceleration. In the first two quarters of
2015, China maintained an enviable growth rate of seven percent. See Mark Magnier, China
Surprises With 7% Growth in Second Quarter, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 21, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-surprises-with-7-growth-in-second-quarter-1436927081.
286. This scenario is likely if China’s economic growth stalls. For a pessimistic view of the
prospect of China’s economy, see Paul Krugman, Hitting China’s Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/opinion/krugman-hitting-chinas-wall.html?_r=0.
287. See supra Part II.
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country-wide antidumping duty rates for Chinese products, forced investigating
authorities to not double-count certain types of Chinese subsidies when applying
countervailing duty law in conjunction with antidumping law, declined to
automatically treat Chinese SOEs as public bodies capable of conferring
subsidies, and refused to infer price distortion merely from government
dominance in the market. These decisions demonstrate trade law’s commitments
to principles even in the face of high protectionist pressures.
Trade law’s responses to China have been rather successful especially
compared to its responses to the previous disruptor of the world trade system––
Japan. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, when Japan was upending the existing
world trade order, the world trade community responded primarily with bilateral
negotiations, retaliations, and threats of retaliations.288 In particular, in one of
the most infamous trade wars in world trade history, the United States reached a
managed-trade agreement with Japan on trade in semiconductor products and,
after Japan allegedly violated the agreement, imposed retaliatory tariffs on
imports from Japan.289 By contrast, the world trade community managed to
avoid such disruptive spikes in tariffs against Chinese products, despite its many
maneuvers not entirely consistent with trade law principles. More importantly,
the world trade community managed to incorporate China into the world trade
system without major political, economic, and social upheavals. As an
indication of that incorporation, China has become one of the countries that
most frequently make use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.290
The interactive dynamics between free trade principles and protectionism
identified in this Article have important policy implications. First of all, they
hold predicative values for the future trajectory of trade law as applied to China.
One important insight from this Article is that trade law is never an outcome of
principles alone, or protectionism alone. Interpretations of trade law—and
predictions of what those interpretations will be—have to be made in light of
both. The ongoing debates on China’s market-economy status after December
2016 provides a perfect example. As discussed above, Paragraph 15(a)(ii) of the
China Accession Protocol, which provides for the use of surrogate values in
antidumping proceedings involving Chinese products, expires in December
2016.291 Views diverge, however, as to whether China should be granted
market-economy status automatically upon the expiration of Article 15(a)(ii), or
whether WTO member countries should be allowed to continute to treat China
as a non-market economy if China does not meet their standards for being
considered a market economy. In February 2016, the European Union launched
288. See John O. Haley, Luck, Law, Culture and Trade: The Intractability of United StatesJapan Trade Conflict, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 403, 413-16 (1989) (discussing trade disputes between
the United States and Japan between the 1950s and the 1980s).
289. See JOHN M. ROTHGEB, JR., U.S. TRADE POLICY: BALANCING ECONOMIC DREAMS AND
POLITICAL REALITIES 189-190 (2001).
290. In 2009 alone, China was a party to half of the fourteen new WTO dispute settlement
proceedings initiated in that year. Ji & Huang, supra note 9, at 2.
291. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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public consultation on how to proceed on China’s market-economy status.292
Options being considered by the EU included automatic market-economy status
for China either with or without strengthened trade remedy rules in other
respects.293 The United States, however, appears reluctant to consider the
possibility of automatically granting China market-economy status.294 While a
full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the analysis set
forth in this Article suggests that the eventual outcome of this issue will not
depend on legal analysis alone.295 Instead, it will depend in large part on
commercial circumstances.296 If the threat from Chinese exports is perceived to
be waning, and if China is showing willingness to allay trading partners’
concerns in other aspects of trade policy such as currency manipulation, it will
be much easier for China’s trading partners to come to the conclusion that the
expiration of Article 15(a)(ii) mandates market-economy status for China.297 In
other words, decisions on China’s market-economy status are inherently policy
decisions, particularly so when the legal analysis does not provide unambiguous
answers.
Finally, the principles-versus-protectionism dynamics identified in this
Article will also likely determine trade law’s responses to the next challenger to
the world trade system. If the next challenger threatens the stability of the world
trade system like China does, trade law will likely show flexibilities on
principles to contain the challenger. The specific issues on which trade law will
show flexibilities, however, may not be the same as those featured in trade law’s
China responses. Particularly, if the next challenger is generally considered a

292. SeePublic online consultation concerning a possible change in the methodology to
establish dumping in trade defence investigations concerning the People’s Republic of China, EUR.
COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=191 (last updated Aug. 1,
2016).
293. See Memorandum from Leopoldo Rubinacci on China Market-Economy Status (Feb. 2,
2016), http://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/160202ChinaMESpaper.pdf [hereinafter
EU Memo on China Market-Economy Status].
294. It was reported that Deputy United States Trade Representative Michael Punke was of the
view that China’s graduation from non-market economy should not be automatic with the change of
a date. See Bryce Baschuck, U.S., China at Logheads Over Market Economy Status, BLOOMBERG
BNA WTO REPORTER (Mar. 11, 2016).
295. It is not helpful that Paragraph 15 of the China Accession Protocol has enough
ambiguities to allow it to be interpreted in different ways. For arguments that Paragraph 15 does not
require automatic market-economy status for China after December 2016, see Alan H. Price, Written
Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Panel%204_Price%20statement_022416.pdf.
296. One of the most important factors in the debates on this issue is the economic impact of
the change in antidumping methodology. For example, as the EU considers granting marketeconomy status to China, its top concern appears to be losses of jobs within the EU in response to
lower antidumping rates for Chinese products. See EU Memo on China Market-Economy Status,
supra note 293, at 4-6.
297. Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute for International Economics holds the same view.
See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission on China’s Shifting Economic Realities and Implications for the United States, at 3,
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Panel%204_Hufbauer%20statement_022416.pdf.
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market-economy country, the next rounds of trade law debates may not revolve
around issues that are peculiar to non-market economies, such as surrogate
values and country-wide rates in antidumping. What is certain, however, is that
trade law will tolerate deviations from principles on some issues and those
deviations will allow trade law to adjust the level of trade protection
commiserate with the level of threats posed by the challenger.
CONCLUSION
World trade has undergone a sea change since China began its ascent in the
global economic order. So has trade law. In almost all major areas of trade law,
there has been a shift towards protectionism at the expense of principles. But on
some of the most important trade policy issues relating to China, trade law has
overcome the urge to become a purely protectionist exercise. These nuanced
responses to China reveal the protean nature of trade law and offer guidance as
to how trade law will likely handle future disruptors of the world trade system.
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